U.S. Weekly Policy and Governance Roundup (December 29, 2025 – January 4, 2026)

Overview

The week spanning December 29, 2025, to January 4, 2026, was dominated by the Trump administration’s large-scale military operation in Venezuela to capture Nicolás Maduro and its aftermath. Alongside this, the administration advanced additional sanctions on Venezuela and Iran, announced new security grants ahead of the 2026 FIFA World Cup, took several domestic enforcement actions, and rolled out workforce, labor, veterans, housing, and election-administration initiatives.

Venezuela Operation and U.S. Policy Statements

Capture of Nicolás Maduro and U.S. Raid on Venezuela

• U.S. forces conducted a large, coordinated air and special-operations raid on Venezuela late January 2–3, disabling segments of Venezuelan air defenses, striking multiple military and government sites, and cutting power in parts of Caracas. About 150 aircraft were involved, operating from bases across the Western Hemisphere, according to U.S. officials.
• Special Forces seized Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife Cilia Flores in or near a safe house in Caracas. They were transferred to a U.S. Navy vessel and then flown to New York, where Maduro is expected to appear in federal court in the Southern District of New York on longstanding U.S. narco‑terrorism and cocaine‑importation conspiracy charges. Flores also faces U.S. drug‑related charges.
• The Venezuelan government denounced the operation as a “kidnapping” and an attack on its sovereignty. Vice President Delcy Rodríguez was designated interim president by Venezuela’s top court but maintains that Maduro remains the only legitimate president. Venezuelan Defense Minister Vladimir Padrino said U.S. strikes killed soldiers, civilians, and much of Maduro’s security detail. Cuba reported 32 of its citizens killed during the raid.
• Streets in Caracas and other cities were tense but largely calm after the operation, with some small pro‑Maduro demonstrations and others expressing relief at his removal, according to international press reporting.

Trump Administration Framing and Rubio’s Messaging

• President Trump and senior officials characterized the action as a combined military and law‑enforcement mission to bring an “indicted narcoterrorist” to U.S. justice and to cut drug trafficking to the United States. Officials repeatedly asserted the operation was directed at criminal organizations and not a war against the Venezuelan state.
• Secretary of State Marco Rubio, in interviews and public statements during the week, said U.S. forces were on Venezuelan soil for “about two hours” during the capture and denied a sustained ground presence. He said the administration would comply with legal requirements for congressional notification and approval in future actions, while arguing this raid did not require prior authorization.
• The administration signaled a broader pressure campaign on Caracas, including:
  • An “oil quarantine” intended to block Venezuelan oil exports via sanctions and ship seizures.
  • Increased targeting of vessels alleged to be engaged in sanctions evasion or drug shipments.
  • Expanded use of economic sanctions linked to alleged Iranian and Hezbollah activity in Venezuela.
• Rubio and other officials argued that Iran and Hezbollah are seeking a foothold in Venezuela and that the United States will act to prevent adversaries from establishing positions in the Western Hemisphere.

Trump’s Statements on Running Venezuela and Possible Second Strike

• In a press conference at Mar‑a‑Lago after the raid, Trump said the United States would place Venezuela under “temporary American control” and “run the country” until a “safe, proper and judicious transition” could be arranged. He said major U.S. oil companies would enter and refurbish Venezuela’s oil infrastructure, which he described as justification for expecting Venezuela’s oil revenue to offset the costs of U.S. actions.
• Trump stated he was “not afraid of boots on the ground” and did not rule out deploying U.S. forces to Venezuela for a longer period. He explicitly rejected working with leading opposition figure and 2024 Nobel Peace Prize laureate María Corina Machado, claiming she lacked domestic support.
• On January 4, speaking to reporters aboard Air Force One, Trump said a second strike on Venezuela was possible if Rodríguez’s interim government did not cooperate with U.S. demands to “fix” the country, including curbing drug trafficking and restructuring the oil sector. He said Rodríguez could “pay a bigger price than Maduro” if she resisted.
• Trump also suggested military action against Colombia and Mexico could be considered if they did not sharply reduce flows of illicit drugs to the U.S., saying “Operation Colombia sounds good to me.” He argued that Venezuelan migration to the U.S., including claims that Venezuela had sent criminals and psychiatric patients, was a factor in the decision to seize Maduro.

International and Domestic Reaction

• Regionally, responses were divided along political lines. Governments led by left‑leaning leaders such as Brazil’s Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Colombia’s Gustavo Petro condemned the U.S. attack as a violation of sovereignty. Right‑leaning governments, including Argentina under Javier Milei, welcomed Maduro’s removal. Some opposition figures in exile and diaspora communities celebrated the operation.
• Russia and China criticized the U.S. action as “hegemonic” and a serious breach of international law, with Beijing saying it threatened peace and security in Latin America and the Caribbean.
• In the U.S., Democratic congressional leaders questioned the operation’s legality and the lack of a clear plan for governance, warning of a potential “endless war.” Some Republican lawmakers associated with non‑interventionist positions also criticized the move. Others in Trump’s political base strongly supported the raid.
• The U.N. Security Council scheduled an emergency session for January 5 to address the attack and the legality of detaining a sitting foreign head of state.

Sanctions and Financial Measures Related to Venezuela and Iran

Treasury Sanctions on Iran–Venezuela Weapons Trade

• On December 30, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned 10 individuals and entities in Venezuela and Iran to disrupt what it described as Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and missile trade with Venezuela and procurement efforts for Iran’s ballistic missile program.
• Venezuela-based Empresa Aeronautica Nacional SA (EANSA) and its chair, José Jesús Urdaneta González, were designated for their role in assembling and maintaining Iranian‑designed Mohajer‑series UAVs in Venezuela (locally branded as ANSU‑series). Treasury said EANSA helped facilitate sales of millions of dollars’ worth of Mohajer‑6 combat drones to Venezuela.
• Three Iran‑based persons and related firms were sanctioned for procuring chemicals such as sodium perchlorate, sebacic acid, and nitrocellulose for Parchin Chemical Industries, part of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization, in support of ballistic‑missile propellant production.
• Additional Iranian entities and individuals associated with the Rayan Fan Group, which Treasury links to IRGC UAV and aerospace programs, were also designated. All U.S.‑linked property of these actors is blocked, and U.S. persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them.

Treasury Sanctions on Venezuelan Oil Traders and Tankers

• On December 31, OFAC sanctioned four companies operating in Venezuela’s oil sector and identified four related oil tankers as blocked property for allegedly transporting Venezuelan crude in violation of U.S. sanctions.
• Treasury described the targeted vessels as part of a “shadow fleet” that supports the “illegitimate” Maduro government by generating revenue through clandestine oil shipments. The move follows earlier sanctions against PDVSA and associated shipping networks to restrict Venezuela’s oil exports.
• The designations mean all U.S.‑linked property of the listed companies and tankers is frozen, and U.S. persons are broadly barred from related transactions, with potential secondary sanctions risks for foreign financial institutions.

Market and Commodity Reactions

• Financial‑market analysts noted that the capture of Maduro and the expanded sanctions added a new geopolitical risk factor. However, several assessments emphasized that Venezuela’s current oil output is relatively small (around 1% of global production), limiting immediate supply shock risk.
• Reuters reported that:
  • Oil prices were volatile but did not experience a sustained spike.
  • Gold and other precious metals saw safe‑haven demand increase following news of the raid on Venezuela.
  • Analysts highlighted uncertainty over the long‑term stability of Latin America and the prospect of further U.S. interventions as key medium‑term risks.

Domestic and International Economic Policy Moves

Tariff Threats Over India’s Russian Oil Purchases

• President Trump told reporters on Air Force One that the U.S. could further raise tariffs on Indian imports if New Delhi does not reduce purchases of Russian crude oil.
• The U.S. had previously doubled some tariff rates on Indian goods to 50% in response to India’s continued buying of Russian oil. Despite that, India’s exports to the U.S. rose in November.
• India is seeking to balance access to discounted Russian oil with its broader trade relationship with Washington. Indian officials have begun requiring refiners to report weekly Russian and U.S. oil purchases and signal they expect Russian crude imports to trend down as they pursue a trade deal with the U.S.

CFIUS-Driven Divestment in Sensitive U.S. Technology

• On January 2, the White House issued an order regarding the acquisition of certain assets of Emcore Corporation by HieFo Corporation, following a review by the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS).
• The order requires HieFo to divest all interests and rights in the identified Emcore assets within 180 days of the order (subject to any CFIUS extension). Within seven days, HieFo must implement controls to prevent prohibited access to the assets or associated information.
• HieFo must submit weekly certifications to CFIUS attesting to compliance and detailing divestment efforts until a final divestment certification is filed. CFIUS then has up to 90 days to verify divestment and notify HieFo once it determines the divestment is complete.

Federal Workforce, Governance, and Regulatory Administration

OPM Actions on Federal Workforce Restructuring

• The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) reported that, under directives from President Trump, it has overseen what it describes as the largest annual reduction in the federal workforce in U.S. history.
• Key figures and policy steps cited by OPM:
  • Approximately 317,000 federal employees are expected to leave government in the current year, more than 90% through voluntary programs and natural attrition.
  • A hiring freeze limited hiring to “mission‑critical” roles, with about 68,000 new federal employees hired, a sharp reduction relative to prior years.
  • A “Deferred Resignation Program” resulted in around 154,000 voluntary resignations used to streamline what the administration characterizes as non‑essential roles.
  • OPM states it cut its own headcount by one‑third, ended programs such as the Federal Executive Institute and Federal Executive Boards, and is consolidating more than 100 HR IT systems under a “Federal HR 2.0” modernization plan.
• OPM also highlighted policy changes intended to:
  • Shift federal hiring toward demonstrable skills rather than self‑assessments.
  • Require agencies, in coordination with OMB, to submit annual headcount plans aligned with statutory missions and presidential priorities.
  • Tighten probationary periods and adjust performance management so that bonuses are more closely tied to measured performance.
• OPM said it will use special salary rate authority to deliver an additional ~2.8% pay increase to certain frontline federal law‑enforcement personnel, citing public-safety recruitment and retention needs.

Campaign-Finance Reporting Requirements for 2026

• The Federal Election Commission (FEC) published its 2026 reporting guidance:
  • All federal political committees must file a 2025 Year‑End report covering activity through December 31, 2025, due January 31, 2026.
  • Committees that raise or spend more than $50,000 in a calendar year (or expect to) are required to file all FEC reports electronically. Electronically filed reports must be received and validated by 11:59 p.m. Eastern Time on the filing deadline; otherwise, the filer is deemed a non‑filer and may face enforcement, including administrative fines.
  • Detailed schedules were issued for quarterly, monthly, pre‑ and post‑election, and special‑election reports for candidates, party committees, PACs, and others. The FEC reiterated that not receiving advance email reminders does not excuse late filing and emphasized treasurers’ responsibility for timely compliance.

Domestic Security, Immigration, and Fraud Enforcement

ICE “Worst of the Worst” Arrests and Self-Deportation Incentive

• DHS reported that U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) continued arrest operations over the Christmas period targeting what it called “worst of the worst” criminal noncitizens.
• A December 29 release highlighted arrests of individuals with prior convictions for homicide, multiple serious felonies, and sexual offenses against children in California, Florida, Colorado, and Texas.
• DHS and Customs and Border Protection (CBP) also promoted a limited‑time offer through the “CBP Home” app under which certain noncitizens in the U.S. without legal status who voluntarily enroll to self‑deport by the end of the year would receive a $3,000 stipend and a free flight to their country of origin.

Minnesota Fraud Investigations and Enforcement Actions

• The White House detailed what it framed as an aggressive multi‑agency effort to respond to a “fraud epidemic” in Minnesota:
  • The Department of Justice is reported to have charged 98 defendants in Minnesota fraud cases, with 64 convictions to date, issuing more than 1,750 subpoenas, executing over 130 search warrants, and conducting more than 1,000 witness interviews.
  • DOJ figures in the White House account indicate that 85 of the 98 charged defendants are Somali‑origin, reflecting the specific communities implicated in these investigations.
  • The Small Business Administration reportedly halted all annual grant program payments to Minnesota and suspended approximately 6,900 borrowers, representing around $400 million in loans, for suspected fraudulent activity, barring those borrowers from new SBA loan programs.
  • DHS is described as conducting door‑to‑door investigations with several hundred Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) officers in Minnesota, resulting in more than 1,000 arrests of individuals labeled as “criminal illegal aliens.”
  • As part of “Operation Twin Shield,” DHS and USCIS previously identified more than 1,300 fraud findings from site visits in Minneapolis–St. Paul and are reviewing cases for potential immigration enforcement measures, including possible denaturalization.

Counter‑Drone Security Ahead of FIFA World Cup 2026

• FEMA announced it had awarded $250 million under the new Counter Unmanned Aircraft Systems (C‑UAS) Grant Program to the 11 U.S. states hosting FIFA World Cup 2026 matches and to the National Capital Region.
• The grants, authorized by the 2025 One Big Beautiful Bill Act and the SAFER SKIES Act, are intended to help state and local agencies detect, identify, track, and mitigate drones posing security risks at large events. FEMA noted this was its fastest non‑disaster grant award, completed 25 days after the application deadline.
• A second tranche of $250 million is to be distributed in 2026 to all U.S. states and territories to build broader C‑UAS detection and response capabilities beyond World Cup venues.

Labor, Employment, and Economic Support

YouthBuild Grants for Pre‑Apprenticeships and AI Literacy

• The Department of Labor (DOL) announced the availability of $98 million in YouthBuild grants to support pre‑apprenticeship programs for young people aged 16–24 in high‑demand sectors such as construction, advanced manufacturing, information technology, and healthcare.
• DOL said it expects to fund approximately 57 individual grants of $1–2 million each. The initiative is aligned with administration goals to expand apprenticeships nationally and strengthen workforce pipelines.
• For the first time, DOL set a target for the share of YouthBuild participants who enter a Registered Apprenticeship within one year of program exit, intended to ensure strong linkages between pre‑apprenticeships and formal apprenticeship sponsors.
• Applicants must now include AI literacy skills in their educational components and are encouraged to integrate AI literacy into occupational training. Applications from charter schools and entities partnering with educational institutions are slated for priority consideration.

Dislocated Worker Assistance in Massachusetts Manufacturing

• DOL awarded a $551,195 National Dislocated Worker Grant to Massachusetts to help workers laid off from The L.S. Starrett Company, a precision tools manufacturer, after 78 workers lost their jobs on June 30, 2025.
• The grant, administered through the state’s Executive Office of Labor and Workforce Development, will fund retraining, skills development, and employment services for affected workers in Franklin and Worcester counties.

Veterans, Housing, and Social Policy

VA Grants to State Veterans Cemeteries

• The Department of Veterans Affairs’ National Cemetery Administration reported that it awarded more than $77 million in FY 2025 grants to expand or improve 20 state Veterans cemeteries and to establish Alaska’s first state Veterans cemetery.
• Key elements of the program:
  • A $16.7 million establishment grant will support creation of the Interior Alaska Veterans Cemetery in Fairbanks, projected to serve more than 12,000 Veterans and eligible family members.
  • Other grant recipients include state cemeteries in Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, Wisconsin, and others, funding projects such as columbaria, pre‑placed crypts, burial receptacles, and facility expansions.
• VA reported that in FY 2025, grant‑funded cemeteries interred over 43,700 Veterans and eligible relatives, about 25% of the 174,705 total annual interments across national and state/tribal/territorial VA‑supported cemeteries.
• Since 1980, VA has awarded more than $1.1 billion in cemetery grants to 124 Veterans cemeteries in 47 states, 14 tribal nations, and three U.S. territories.

Housing and Disaster Recovery

• HUD highlighted, via an “ICYMI” notice referencing an op‑ed by Secretary Turner, that Federal Housing Administration (FHA)‑insured mortgages facilitated home purchases for over 1 million Americans in the past year.
• HUD also reported delivering $12 billion in disaster‑recovery funding to communities affected by floods, storms, and other catastrophes, as part of its broader housing and resilience portfolio.

Election Administration and Political Finance Oversight

• Beyond the general 2026 reporting calendar, the FEC guidance emphasized:
  • Mandatory electronic filing for committees crossing the $50,000 annual receipts/expenditures threshold.
  • Strict deadlines for 48‑hour and 24‑hour reports for large last‑minute contributions and independent expenditures.
  • Special additional filing obligations for committees active in 2026 special elections.
  • Ongoing requirements for reporting electioneering communications and lobbyist bundling once specified monetary thresholds are met.

U.S. Foreign Policy and Regional Engagement Beyond Venezuela

Haiti National Day Statement

• In a statement marking Haiti’s National Day (January 1), the U.S. State Department reiterated support for efforts to stabilize the country and prepare for national elections in 2026.
• The U.S. said it continues to back the establishment of a specialized Gang Suppression Force intended to work alongside Haitian security forces against armed gangs and U.S.‑designated foreign terrorist organizations operating in Haiti.
• The statement acknowledged what it described as progress by Haiti’s transitional government and provisional electoral council toward organizing elections, and pledged ongoing diplomatic and technical assistance for a secure electoral process.

Broader Regional and Security Context

• The Treasury sanctions targeting Iran–Venezuela weapons cooperation, combined with the large‑scale U.S. operation to capture Maduro and new oil‑trade sanctions, underscored an intensified U.S. focus on limiting Iranian influence and arms sales in Latin America while further isolating Caracas economically.
• The Haiti National Day message and DHS/FEMA security actions around the FIFA World Cup 2026 fit into a broader pattern of U.S. regional engagement framed around counter‑crime, counter‑terrorism, and event‑driven security planning in the Western Hemisphere.