Executive Order 14199 (Feb. 4, 2025) ordered the Secretary of State, in consultation with the U.S. Ambassador to the U.N., to review all international intergovernmental organizations the U.S. belongs to (and funds) and all conventions and treaties to which the U.S. is a party, and to identify which ones are “contrary to the interests of the United States” and whether they can be reformed. The Secretary was then to report findings and recommendations on possible U.S. withdrawal to the President.
The January 7, 2026 memorandum is the follow‑on step: it states that the President has considered the Secretary’s report under EO 14199 and, based on it, directs agencies to “take immediate steps to effectuate the withdrawal of the United States” from the specific organizations listed in Section 2 of the memorandum.
The memorandum itself defines “withdrawal” only for U.N. entities and leaves the rest to existing law and future guidance:
• For U.N. entities: Section 1(c) of the Jan. 7, 2026 memorandum says: “For United Nations entities, withdrawal means ceasing participation in or funding to those entities to the extent permitted by law.” In other words, agencies must stop taking part in their work and stop providing U.S. funding, but only as far as U.S. statutes and appropriations allow.
• For non‑U.N. organizations and for treaties/conventions: The memorandum directs agencies to “effectuate the withdrawal of the United States from the organizations listed” and refers back to Executive Order 14199, but it does not give a special legal definition. In practice, withdrawal generally means the U.S. government: – follows the exit procedures in each organization’s charter or the relevant treaty (usually formal notice to a depositary or governing body and a waiting period); and – acts consistently with U.S. domestic law (some withdrawals or funding cuts may require or be constrained by Congress).
The details of how that is done day‑to‑day are left to the Secretary of State’s “implementation guidance” under Section 3 of the memorandum and to general U.S. treaty‑practice rules, rather than being fully specified in this document.
Public information is incomplete and scattered, so it is not possible to give a precise, up‑to‑date breakdown for every listed body. However, available data show that many of the organizations on the list currently receive some level of U.S. funding and/or host U.S. personnel:
• Major U.N. entities on the list with documented recent U.S. funding include: – UN Population Fund (UNFPA): The U.S. returned as a key donor under Biden; in 2023 it was UNFPA’s largest government donor, providing about 11% of all contributions (exact dollar amounts vary by year). – UN Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women): The U.S. is regularly listed among UN Women’s top government donors in recent resource overviews. – UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): The U.S. pays assessed contributions to the U.N. regular budget and to UNFCCC, and it funds its participation in climate negotiations (aggregated in State Department “Contributions to International Organizations” reports).
• Non‑U.N. climate and energy bodies: – Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): U.S. agencies (e.g., NOAA, NASA, DOE, EPA) have historically provided voluntary financial support and extensive in‑kind contributions through U.S. scientists serving as authors and reviewers for IPCC reports. – International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA): The U.S. is a member; State Department reports to Congress on contributions to international organizations list annual U.S. monetary contributions (low tens of millions of dollars range), and U.S. officials participate in IRENA governing bodies. – International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN): The U.S. government (e.g., U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service) and numerous U.S. NGOs are members; the U.S. provides project and membership funding and sends experts who serve on IUCN commissions and working groups.
• Personnel: Across these bodies, many U.S. citizens work as: – international civil servants on staff contracts (e.g., at UNFPA, UN Women, UN agencies, IRENA, IUCN Secretariat), and – external experts or government delegates (e.g., IPCC authors, IUCN commission members, delegates to boards and conferences).
Because State Department contribution reports for FY 2023–2024 are not fully accessible here and many funds are pooled or channeled via multiple agencies, exact current dollar amounts and headcounts for each of the 66 listed organizations cannot be reliably specified from available open sources.
The memorandum requires agencies to begin work immediately but does not give fixed calendar deadlines or a single, detailed step‑by‑step process. Based on the memorandum and standard U.S. practice, the expected timeline and steps are:
• Start “as soon as possible”: Section 1(c) directs all departments and agencies “to take immediate steps to effectuate the withdrawal of the United States from the organizations listed in section 2 … as soon as possible.” No specific end date is set.
• State Department implementation guidance: Section 3 instructs the Secretary of State to “provide additional guidance as needed to agencies when implementing this memorandum.” That guidance will normally: – map out legal exit procedures and notice requirements for each body; – set internal timelines (e.g., when to send withdrawal letters, how to wind down participation); and – coordinate with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on funding changes.
• Typical operational steps (implied, not individually listed in the memo): – legal review of each organization’s charter/treaty to identify withdrawal clauses and notice periods; – formal diplomatic notifications of withdrawal or cessation of participation/funding; – budget and contract adjustments to stop new payments, consistent with appropriations law; – instructions to U.S. missions and agencies to halt participation in meetings, boards, and projects once notice periods end; and – internal reporting back to the White House and National Security Council.
Because the memorandum expressly says implementation must be “consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations” (Sec. 4(b)), in some cases withdrawal may be gradual or contingent on future appropriations and, if needed, congressional action.
Withdrawing from bodies like the IPCC and IUCN does not shut down U.S. climate or conservation work, but it is expected to weaken U.S. access to global science, standards, and coordination.
• Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC): – The IPCC is the U.N. body that assesses climate science and produces consensus reports used worldwide to guide climate policy. – U.S. government agencies and scientists have historically been major contributors of data, modeling, and authorship to IPCC assessments. – Ending U.S. government participation and funding would likely: ▸ reduce U.S. influence over the framing and content of global climate assessments; and ▸ force U.S. agencies to rely more on domestic assessments or secondary access to IPCC work, rather than shaping it directly.
• International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN): – IUCN maintains the Red List of Threatened Species and sets influential conservation standards and guidelines. – U.S. agencies (like the Fish and Wildlife Service) and U.S. scientists use IUCN data and participate in its commissions. – Withdrawal would likely: ▸ limit formal U.S. government input into global conservation criteria and listing decisions; and ▸ reduce U.S. access to IUCN decision‑making fora and some joint initiatives, even though public data (e.g., Red List) would remain accessible.
Overall, U.S. domestic climate and conservation programs can continue under U.S. law, but the government would be stepping back from multilateral forums that coordinate science, data, and policy standards, which most analyses expect to weaken U.S. leadership and reduce its ability to shape global rules and priorities.
The memorandum gives the Secretary of State the central coordination role; day‑to‑day implementation will be run mainly through the State Department and U.S. missions, with other agencies following State’s lead.
• Formal role: – Section 3: “The Secretary of State shall provide additional guidance as needed to agencies when implementing this memorandum.” – Executive Order 14199 already tasked the Secretary (with the U.N. Ambassador) to lead the original review and report back to the President.
• Day‑to‑day functions (in practice): – drafting and sending formal withdrawal or non‑participation notices to each organization; – interpreting legal obligations and withdrawal clauses in each body’s charter or treaty; – coordinating with OMB on stopping or reallocating U.S. contributions; and – instructing U.S. embassies, missions, and line agencies when to cease attending meetings, voting, or serving on governing bodies.
• Inter‑agency coordination: – State will work with affected departments (e.g., Energy, Interior, EPA, USAID, Defense) through normal interagency processes, typically via the National Security Council and OMB, to align legal, diplomatic, and budget steps. – Agencies are responsible for implementing the guidance within their programs and contracts, but the memo keeps State in charge of external diplomacy and overall policy coherence.
The memorandum itself does not spell out detailed protections or transition programs for ongoing projects or for U.S. citizens working in these organizations. Its only explicit safeguards are:
• Legal and budget constraints: Section 4(b) states that implementation “shall be implemented consistent with applicable law and subject to the availability of appropriations.” This means agencies must honor existing U.S. statutes and appropriations, which can: – limit how quickly funding can be cut; and – require orderly wind‑down of grants and contracts.
• No new enforceable rights: Section 4(c) says the memorandum does not create any enforceable rights or benefits for any party, including U.S. officers or employees, so it does not guarantee job protection or compensation for individuals.
In practice, protections and transitions for programs and personnel are likely to come from:
• standard U.S. government procedures for phasing out grants and cooperative agreements (e.g., honoring existing obligations where legally required); • employment rules of the international organizations themselves (most U.S. citizens on staff are employed under those entities’ contracts, not as U.S. federal employees); and • any specific guidance the State Department and other agencies may later issue under Section 3, which is not yet publicly detailed.
At this time, there is no publicly available, government‑wide transition plan that sets out special protections beyond these general legal and budget constraints.