In this case, the U.S. is using its immigration law to:
• Revoke existing U.S. visas of Honduran officials involved in obstructing the vote count, under Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) §221(i). Once revoked, those visas can no longer be used to travel to the U.S. • Refuse new visa applications and treat such individuals as “inadmissible” to the United States under INA §212(a)(3)(C), which bars entry if the Secretary of State believes their entry or activities could have “potentially serious adverse” foreign‑policy consequences.
Practically, that means targeted officials cannot use prior visas, cannot get new visas, and are barred from legally entering the U.S. while the restrictions are in effect.
The press statement names two Honduran officials and refers to one more unnamed person:
• Mario Morazán – his existing U.S. visas were revoked under INA §221(i) for “undermining democracy in Honduras by impeding the vote count.” Morazán is reported to be a magistrate of the Electoral Justice Tribunal and aligned with the ruling LIBRE party. • Marlon Ochoa – his visa application was refused, and he is being restricted under INA §212(a)(3)(C) for undermining democracy. Ochoa is a member of the National Electoral Council, also linked to LIBRE. • An additional, unnamed individual – the State Department says it has “taken steps to impose visa restrictions on another individual” for the same conduct, but does not identify that person publicly.
Other Honduran officials could be targeted in the future if the U.S. concludes they are impeding the vote count or otherwise undermining democracy, since §212(a)(3)(C) is a discretionary foreign‑policy tool.
The State Department’s statement does not spell out a legal definition of “interfering with the 2025 election vote count.” Instead, it describes the conduct broadly as “undermining democracy in Honduras by impeding the vote count.”
From the announcement and contemporaneous reporting, this has been understood to mean actions by electoral officials that stall, obstruct, or manipulate the official counting and certification of votes—especially in a way that prolongs uncertainty or calls the integrity of the result into question. However, there is no detailed, formal list of prohibited acts published in the press release or the cited immigration law sections; the determination is left to U.S. foreign‑policy judgment under INA §212(a)(3)(C).
The legal authority comes from two sections of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA):
• INA §221(i) (8 U.S.C. §1201(i)) – gives the Secretary of State discretion to revoke a visa “at any time” after issuance. This is what was used to cancel Mario Morazán’s existing visas. • INA §212(a)(3)(C) (8 U.S.C. §1182(a)(3)(C)) – makes a non‑citizen inadmissible (ineligible for a visa and entry) if the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds to believe their entry or activities would have “potentially serious adverse foreign policy consequences” for the United States. This is the basis for refusing Marlon Ochoa’s visa and imposing restrictions on others.
These INA provisions are long‑standing immigration and foreign‑policy tools that the State Department can invoke unilaterally, without needing new legislation for each case.
Enforcement is done entirely through the U.S. visa and border‑control system:
• Visa revocation: Using INA §221(i), the State Department updates its records to mark a person’s existing visa as revoked. Airlines and U.S. border officials (Customs and Border Protection) check these databases; a revoked visa cannot be used to board a U.S.-bound flight or enter the country. • Visa refusal/inadmissibility: Under INA §212(a)(3)(C), consular officers must refuse to issue new visas to the named individuals, and U.S. border officials must deny them admission if they try to enter. • Duration and scope: These measures stay in place until the State Department decides to lift them; there is no automatic end date, and the underlying evidence is generally not made public or subject to court review, giving the Department wide practical control.
In practice, this means the affected Honduran officials lose the ability to legally travel to, transit through, or conduct official or private visits in the United States.
The visa restrictions add tension to U.S.–Honduras relations but stop short of broader economic or diplomatic sanctions:
• Symbolically, they signal U.S. disapproval of how Honduran electoral authorities handled the vote count and frame the dispute as a threat to “our region’s stability” and U.S. national security. • Practically, they personally penalize senior officials close to the ruling LIBRE party without directly targeting the Honduran state or economy, which lets Washington apply pressure while keeping cooperation on other issues (migration, security, trade) formally intact. • News coverage notes that the move came alongside strong public U.S. pressure on Honduras to resume and complete the stalled count, which Honduran authorities did; this suggests the restrictions are being used as leverage rather than a full diplomatic break.
Overall, the step is likely to strain political trust and feed accusations of external interference in Honduran politics, but it remains a limited, targeted tool within an ongoing bilateral relationship.
If the main State Department page is unavailable, the full text of the press release can be read at:
• The U.S. Embassy in Honduras (English): “Visa Restrictions on Honduran Government Officials Interfering with the 2025 Election Vote Count,” which reproduces the statement in full. • The U.S. Embassy in Honduras (Spanish): “Restricciones de visa a funcionarios del gobierno hondureño que interfieren en el conteo de votos de las elecciones de 2025,” an official Spanish translation with a link back to the original. • A mirror copy hosted by GlobalSecurity.org, which quotes the State Department press statement verbatim.
These sources provide the same core text that is on the original state.gov URL referenced in the metadata.