Treasury Targets Iran-Venezuela Weapons Trade

The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) is a bureau of the U.S. Department of the Treasury that administers and enforces U.S. economic and trade sanctions. Using authorities given by Congress and the President (for example under national emergency powers and sanctions laws), OFAC can:

• Block or "freeze" property and interests in property under U.S. jurisdiction;
• Prohibit U.S. persons and entities from doing most transactions with sanctioned countries, individuals, and companies; and
• Impose civil penalties for sanctions violations. These powers are used to advance U.S. foreign policy and national security objectives, including countering terrorism, narcotics trafficking, weapons proliferation, and other threats.

Executive Order (E.O.) 13382 and E.O. 13949 are both sanctions authorities but target different kinds of activity:

• E.O. 13382 (2005) targets proliferators of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their supporters. It freezes the U.S. property of persons involved in developing, producing, or spreading nuclear, chemical, biological weapons, and their delivery systems (such as ballistic missiles), and bars U.S. persons from dealing with them.
• E.O. 13949 (2020) targets conventional arms activities of Iran, i.e., people and entities involved in the sale, supply, or transfer of conventional weapons and related materiel to or from Iran, or supporting Iran’s conventional arms programs.

Key difference: 13382 is a broad WMD/nonproliferation tool used globally, while 13949 is focused specifically on Iran’s conventional arms trade and related support.

Both are unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) derived from Iran’s Mohajer family, but with different sizes and roles:

• Mohajer‑6 (Iranian): a medium-sized intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and attack drone. Open sources describe it as able to:

  • Operate to roughly 200 km or more from its control station;
  • Stay aloft for many hours (around 12 hours in some military descriptions);
  • Carry up to four precision‑guided munitions (typically Qaem or similar small air‑to‑ground bombs) for strikes, while also carrying electro‑optical surveillance sensors.

• ANSU‑100 (Venezuelan): a locally branded, updated, armed version of Iran’s Mohajer‑2, operated by Venezuela.

  • Treasury states it is an “updated, armed version” of the Arpía‑001 (Mohajer‑2 derivative) and that it can launch Iranian‑designed Qaem air‑to‑ground guided bombs.
  • Open-source databases treating the ANSU‑100/Mohajer‑2N as similar to Mohajer‑2 give it a short tactical range (tens of kilometers), modest speed (under 200 km/h), and a light payload (on the order of ~15 kg), suitable for basic surveillance and small guided munitions.

So, Mohajer‑6 is a more modern, higher‑end combat/ISR drone with greater range and payload, while ANSU‑100 is a smaller tactical drone upgraded by Venezuela to carry light guided bombs.

Empresa Aeronáutica Nacional S.A. (EANSA) is a Venezuelan state aerospace company that assembles and maintains aircraft and drones, including Iranian‑designed Mohajer‑series UAVs rebranded as ANSU‑series for Venezuela. According to the U.S. Treasury, EANSA:

• Maintains and oversees assembly of Qods Aviation Industries’ Mohajer‑series UAVs in Venezuela;
• Negotiated purchases of millions of dollars’ worth of Mohajer‑6 drones; and
• Maintains UAVs used by the Venezuelan armed forces, including the Mohajer‑2/ANSU‑100.

José Jesús Urdaneta González is identified as the chair of EANSA. Treasury says he has coordinated, on EANSA’s behalf, with Venezuelan and Iranian military representatives on UAV production in Venezuela, and designates him under E.O. 13949 for acting for or on behalf of EANSA.

Parchin Chemical Industries (PCI) is a branch of Iran’s Defense Industries Organization (DIO). It produces ammunition, explosives, and solid propellants for rockets and missiles, and handles import/export of missile‑related chemical goods. PCI has been sanctioned by the U.S. and listed by the UN for its role in Iran’s missile and WMD programs.

In solid rocket motors (used in many ballistic missiles), chemicals mentioned in the article are key ingredients:

• Sodium perchlorate is an oxidizer used to make ammonium perchlorate, which is the main oxidizer in many solid rocket propellants.
• Nitrocellulose is an energetic binder/explosive used in propellants to improve burning characteristics and performance.
• Together with fuels and binders (and additives like sebacic‑acid‑based plasticizers), they form the solid propellant that burns rapidly to generate high‑temperature gas, providing thrust for rockets and ballistic missiles.

Secondary sanctions are penalties the U.S. can impose on non‑U.S. persons or foreign financial institutions that do certain types of business with U.S.-sanctioned parties, even if those transactions have no direct U.S. nexus.

In this context, Treasury warns that foreign banks that knowingly conduct or facilitate significant transactions for the newly designated entities or individuals risk secondary sanctions. OFAC can, for example, prohibit or severely restrict those banks’ ability to open or maintain U.S. correspondent or payable‑through accounts, which can effectively cut them off from the U.S. financial system. That threat is meant to deter foreign banks from servicing the sanctioned network at all.

A person or company on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List can seek removal (“delisting”) by formally petitioning OFAC:

1. Submit a written petition (by email or mail) to OFAC’s Reconsideration unit requesting removal from the relevant sanctions list.
2. Include identifying details (name, addresses, copy of ID), the SDN listing information, and a detailed explanation and evidence showing why the listing is wrong or why the circumstances have changed (for example, mistaken identity, change in behavior, or that the underlying conduct has ceased).
3. OFAC reviews the petition under procedures in 31 C.F.R. § 501.807, may request more information, and then decides whether to remove or keep the listing. If denied, the person can reapply, especially if there is new evidence.

Treasury’s own press release on this action points listed parties to these same delisting procedures.