The War Department Strengthens Measures to Protect DOW‑Funded Research

Emil Michael announced implementation of a new “Fundamental Research Security Initiatives and Implementation” memo that immediately does the following:

• Blocks Department of War (DoW) fundamental research assistance awards from going to any company listed under Section 1260H of the National Defense Authorization Act (Chinese military companies operating in the U.S.).
• Creates a department‑wide Fundamental Research Risk Review Repository so all DoW components can share information on risks in research awards.
• Starts work to identify and deploy automated vetting and continuous monitoring tools to spot and reduce foreign influence risks where practical.
• Expands annual spot checks of research awards, requires standardized reporting of current and pending foreign support, adds more training for research‑security staff, and coordinates joint reviews of problem cases highlighted by Congress. These measures together are meant to harden security around all DoW‑funded research projects.

In this context, “DoW‑funded research” means any research and development work that receives money from the U.S. Department of War, whether through grants, cooperative agreements, contracts, or other assistance awards.

The memo and release focus especially on “fundamental research assistance awards,” which are unclassified, publishable academic‑style projects funded by DoW but carried out mainly outside the department (for example, at universities and research institutes). That aligns with broader federal usage, where U.S.‑government‑supported R&D includes basic and applied research funded across many institutions, both inside and outside government.

Organizations most directly affected include:

• Universities and colleges receiving DoW grants or cooperative agreements.
• Non‑profit research organizations, FFRDCs, and UARCs that get DoW funding.
• Private companies and contractors (including small businesses) receiving DoW research assistance awards.
• Internal DoW labs and agencies (like DARPA, MDA, service labs) that manage and oversee these awards and must apply the new checks.

The memo does not publish a more detailed legal definition, so “DoW‑funded research” should be understood broadly as any R&D supported with DoW money, with the new restrictions applying at least to all fundamental research assistance awards.

Emil Michael is the Under Secretary of War for Research and Engineering (USW(R&E)) and the Chief Technology Officer for the U.S. Department of War.

Who he is:

• Senior presidential appointee with prior service as a White House Fellow and Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, and extensive private‑sector technology and investment experience.
• Has helped build technology companies such as D‑Wave Systems, Tellme Networks, and Uber.

Core responsibilities of the Under Secretary for Research and Engineering:

• Provides strategic direction and oversight for the department’s entire research, development, and prototyping enterprise.
• Ensures U.S. military technological superiority and keeps the department at the forefront of innovation.
• Exercises direct oversight of key organizations such as the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and the Missile Defense Agency (MDA).

In practice, this role sets technology priorities, manages major R&D portfolios, and issues policies like the new research‑security initiatives described in the article.

The memo directly changes how universities, contractors, and researchers interact with the Department of War when they receive research funding:

For universities and research institutions:

• They cannot use DoW fundamental research assistance awards in ways that benefit companies listed under Section 1260H (Chinese military companies in the U.S.).
• Their DoW‑funded projects are subject to more frequent spot checks, and they must provide standardized disclosures of all current and pending foreign support for project personnel.
• They will see more required research‑security training and may be asked to cooperate with automated vetting and continuous‑monitoring tools applied to awards or key personnel.

For contractors and companies:

• Firms on the Section 1260H list become ineligible for DoW fundamental research assistance awards.
• Other companies must expect tighter due‑diligence screening, disclosure requirements about foreign ties, and possible automated monitoring for foreign‑influence risks.

For individual researchers:

• Researchers on DoW‑funded awards must fully disclose foreign support and affiliations in a standardized way.
• Their awards may be subject to random compliance checks, and any undisclosed foreign relationships could trigger coordinated review by DoW and congressional oversight bodies.

Overall, the measures do not ban collaboration or foreign nationals, but they raise the paperwork, vetting, and oversight burden on any institution or person working on DoW‑funded research, especially where there are foreign ties.

The Department of War’s release does not provide formal definitions of “malign foreign influence” or “other forms of exploitation,” but its usage follows broader U.S. research‑security policy.

In that context:

• “Malign foreign influence” generally means activities by foreign governments, organizations, or their proxies that undermine research integrity or national/economic security—for example, using reward, deception, coercion, or theft to gain access to sensitive research or steer it in ways that serve a foreign state’s strategic aims rather than open, honest science.
• “Other forms of exploitation” is a catch‑all term for ways adversaries can misuse DoW‑funded research, such as covertly transferring results or know‑how to foreign militaries, manipulating collaborations or talent programs to bypass export‑control rules, or misappropriating data and prototypes for strategic or commercial advantage.

These concepts align with U.S. government research‑security guidance, which defines research security as protecting federally funded R&D against foreign government interference, misappropriation, and related violations of research integrity.

The memo strengthens monitoring and enforcement mainly by adding new screening tools and more systematic checks on DoW‑funded projects:

Monitoring and detection:

• Creation of a Fundamental Research Risk Review Repository so all DoW components can share information on risks and problem awards, helping spot patterns of foreign influence or IP leakage.
• Development of automated vetting and continuous‑monitoring capabilities (where feasible) to flag foreign ties, high‑risk entities, or other indicators of research‑security threats.
• Annual spot checks of research awards expanded, so more projects are randomly reviewed for compliance with disclosure and security rules.

Enforcement mechanisms:

• Prohibition on funding any company on the Section 1260H NDAA list through DoW fundamental research assistance awards; this is a clear, enforceable funding bar.
• Standardized reporting of current and pending foreign support, giving DoW a basis to identify non‑disclosures or conflicts and to suspend or terminate awards if rules are violated.
• Expanded training for research‑security personnel, improving their ability to identify and respond to possible IP theft or foreign exploitation.
• Coordinated assessments of cases flagged by congressional committees, adding political and legal pressure to act on serious or systemic violations.

Together, these measures give the department more data, more tools, and clearer red‑lines (like the 1260H list) to detect non‑compliance and to cut off funding or take other actions when IP theft or malign influence is suspected.