U.S. designates Lebanese, Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood chapters as terrorist entities

“Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT)” is a US sanctions label used for people or organizations the government says commit, plan, or support terrorism, under Executive Order 13224 and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

Key legal consequences:

• All property and interests in property of an SDGT that are in the US or held/controlled by US persons must be frozen (blocked).
• US persons (citizens, residents, US companies, and anyone in the US) are generally banned from providing or receiving any funds, goods, or services to/from an SDGT, unless licensed by the Treasury Department.
• Violating these sanctions can lead to significant civil fines and criminal penalties; foreign financial institutions can also face “secondary” sanctions for significant dealings with SDGTs.

These rules now apply to the Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood as an organization and to Muhammad Fawzi Taqqosh personally, and to the Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood branches as SDGTs.

A Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) is a group the US Secretary of State designates under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act as foreign, involved in terrorism, and threatening US national security.

Main differences from an SDGT label:

• FTO (statutory):
  • Makes it a federal crime (18 U.S.C. § 2339B) for anyone in or subject to US jurisdiction to knowingly provide “material support or resources” (money, training, services, etc.) to the group, punishable by up to 20 years in prison (or life if death results).
  • Triggers immigration bars and possible removal for members and representatives.
  • Requires US financial institutions to block funds in which the FTO or its agents have an interest.
• SDGT (sanctions under EO 13224):
  • Focuses on freezing assets and banning almost all transactions with US persons; it does not by itself create the specific 18 U.S.C. § 2339B “material support to an FTO” offense, though violating sanctions can still be a crime under IEEPA.

The Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood is both an FTO and an SDGT; the Egyptian and Jordanian chapters are SDGTs but not FTOs.

Executive Order (EO) 14362, signed by President Trump on November 24, 2025, is titled “Designation of Certain Muslim Brotherhood Chapters as Foreign Terrorist Organizations and Specially Designated Global Terrorists.”

What it does:

• States that Muslim Brotherhood chapters in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt engage in or support violence and destabilization, including rocket attacks from Lebanon after October 7, 2023, calls by an Egyptian MB leader for attacks on US partners, and long‑standing material support from Jordanian MB leaders to Hamas’s militant wing.
• Directs the Secretaries of State and Treasury to, within 30 days, report to the President on designating specific Muslim Brotherhood chapters (including in Lebanon, Jordan, and Egypt) as:
  • FTOs under INA § 219 (8 U.S.C. § 1189), and/or
  • SDGTs under IEEPA and EO 13224.
• Then requires them, within 45 days of that report, to take “all appropriate action” to make those designations under the existing FTO and SDGT authorities.

Legal authority:

• Cites the President’s powers under the US Constitution, the Immigration and Nationality Act, and the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). In practice, it uses those statutes to prioritize and accelerate the use of the already‑existing FTO and SDGT designation mechanisms against selected Muslim Brotherhood chapters.

Muhammad Fawzi Taqqosh (also spelled Takkoush/Takush/Taqush) is the secretary general (top leader) of the Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood, also known as al‑Jamaa al‑Islamiyah.

According to the US government:

• He is the head of the Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood and is designated individually as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist.
• Under his leadership, the group reactivated its al‑Fajr Forces after the October 7, 2023 Hamas attack, coordinated rocket fire from Lebanon into northern Israel alongside Hizballah and Hamas, and pushed the group toward closer alignment with the “Hizballah–Hamas axis.”

The US designation is based on his leadership role in this organization and its armed wing.

The US government’s public justification for linking the Egyptian and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) chapters to Hamas comes mainly from:

• Treasury’s January 13, 2026 sanctions notice, which states that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (EMB) and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (JMB):
  • Provide “significant material support to Hamas,” which is itself a US‑designated FTO and SDGT.
  • As of 2025, EMB and Hamas “coordinated on possible terrorist activities against Israeli interests in the Middle East.”
  • In mid‑2025, leaders of Hamas’s military wing worked with EMB to “undermine and destabilize the Egyptian government,” and EMB accepted Hamas funding to do so.
  • In 2024, would‑be foreign fighters going to Gaza to fight for Hamas needed MB connections; once in Egypt they linked up with MB networks to enter Gaza, with MB personnel keeping Hamas informed on their movements.
  • As of 2023, a Muslim Brotherhood member in Saudi Arabia raised funds for Hamas and transferred them to Hamas militants before returning to Egypt.
  • For Jordan, elements linked to the Muslim Brotherhood were involved in terrorism cases, including “manufacturing rockets, explosives, and drones, as well as recruitment operations,” financed via illegal fundraising, in cooperation with entities abroad.
• EO 14362 adds that:
  • A senior Egyptian MB leader on October 7, 2023 called for violent attacks against US partners and interests.
  • Jordanian MB leaders have “long provided material support to the militant wing of Hamas.”

These cited activities are the factual basis the US gives for designating the Egyptian and Jordanian MB branches as SDGTs for material support to Hamas.

For people or entities that deal with these designated groups, the main effects are:

For SDGT designations (Lebanese, Egyptian, and Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood chapters; Taqqosh personally):

• All property and interests in property of the designated parties that are in the US or held/controlled by US persons must be frozen.
• US persons (including banks, companies, charities, and individuals) are generally prohibited from:
  • Providing any funds, goods, or services to them, or
  • Receiving any funds, goods, or services from them, unless licensed by the US Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC).
• US and foreign persons who violate these sanctions can face civil fines and, for willful violations, criminal penalties; foreign banks risk “secondary” sanctions (restrictions on their US correspondent accounts) if they conduct significant transactions for the designated groups.

Additional effects of FTO status (Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood only):

• Anyone in the US or otherwise subject to US jurisdiction who “knowingly provides material support or resources” to the Lebanese Muslim Brotherhood commits a separate federal crime (18 U.S.C. § 2339B), punishable by up to 20 years in prison (or life if death results).
• Members and representatives of the group can be denied visas or removed from the US.

In practice, banks, charities, businesses, and individuals with any ties to these chapters will usually stop all transactions and contacts that could be seen as providing money, services, or other support, to avoid sanctions or prosecution.

The designations are likely to create or deepen diplomatic friction, but the exact impact on relations with Egypt, Jordan, and Lebanon is not yet fully clear.

Context:

• All three governments already treat at least parts of the Muslim Brotherhood as illegal or highly restricted:
  • Egypt has long banned the Muslim Brotherhood and labels it a terrorist organization.
  • Jordan officially dissolved the Muslim Brotherhood in 2020 and has prosecuted some members.
  • Lebanon allows al‑Jamaa al‑Islamiyah (Lebanese MB) to operate legally and hold a parliament seat.
• The designations target chapters that operate within these states, and the US explicitly frames the move as supporting regional partners and countering Hamas and other armed groups.

Likely diplomatic effects:

• With Egypt and Jordan, whose governments are already hostile to their domestic Muslim Brotherhood branches, the move broadly aligns with their internal policies, so it may cause limited direct damage to bilateral ties, though they may object to US extraterritorial reach or any spillover onto their domestic politics.
• With Lebanon, where al‑Jamaa al‑Islamiyah is a legal political actor, branding it an FTO could complicate US engagement with Lebanese institutions in which its members participate and may draw public criticism from Lebanese parties who see this as foreign interference, adding to already strained US–Lebanon relations.

Public reporting so far (including regional media) notes the move as controversial but does not yet document specific diplomatic retaliatory steps by Egypt, Jordan, or Lebanon.