S&T Joins New Cross-Government Collaboration to Counter Drone Threats

The Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) is one of the main components inside the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS). It serves as DHS’s primary research‑and‑development arm and as the science advisor to the DHS Secretary. S&T funds and runs technology projects, tests and evaluates new tools, and provides scientific expertise to DHS operational components (like Border Patrol, TSA, FEMA, Secret Service) and to state and local first responders, so it sits alongside those operational agencies but with a specialized R&D and advisory role rather than an enforcement role.

Joint Interagency Task Force 401 (JIATF 401) is a Defense Department task force, led by the Army, created in August 2025 to be the U.S. military’s premier organization for countering small unmanned aerial systems (small drones). It reports to the Deputy Secretary of Defense and is designed to:

• Rapidly develop, test, and field joint counter‑small‑UAS (C‑sUAS) capabilities for U.S. forces, with “expanded authorities” to cut through normal acquisition bureaucracy and speed up delivery of systems.
• Coordinate a whole‑of‑government approach to defending the U.S. homeland, focusing initially on the National Capital Region, the southern border, and major events like the 2026 FIFA World Cup.
• Lead joint training through efforts such as the Joint Counter‑sUAS University and interagency courses, and integrate sensors, effectors and command‑and‑control across services and civilian partners. Its authorities are primarily organizational and acquisition‑related (how to develop and field C‑UAS systems quickly); it still must operate within existing law and specific statutory counter‑UAS authorities held by DoD, DHS, DOJ, etc.

Public reporting says “almost 50” federal agencies are participating, but a full official list has not been released. Named participants and their described roles include:

• Department of Defense / War Department (lead, with JIATF 401 and the Army): overall lead for the task force; develops and fields C‑sUAS systems for U.S. forces; integrates sensors and defenses for homeland areas like the National Capital Region and the southern border.
• Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and DHS Science & Technology Directorate (S&T): co‑lead for homeland defense aspects; tests and evaluates counter‑drone technologies (including kinetic mitigation in North Dakota and swarm/dark‑drone detection in Oklahoma) and shares technical data and risk analysis with partners.
• Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): runs the National Counter‑UAS Training Center in Huntsville, Alabama, to train state, local, tribal and territorial law enforcement officers on counter‑UAS and to prepare for events such as the 2026 World Cup, America 250, and the Olympics.
• Department of Transportation and Federal Aviation Administration (FAA): represent civil‑aviation safety and airspace regulation; help ensure that any detection or mitigation measures are integrated into national airspace management and do not endanger legitimate aircraft.
• Other DHS components (such as U.S. Customs and Border Protection and the U.S. Secret Service) participate in S&T testing events and are expected to be end‑users of vetted counter‑drone systems near the border and at high‑risk protected sites. Beyond these, DoD notes roughly 50 federal partners, implying participation from other law‑enforcement, intelligence, and critical‑infrastructure agencies, but their specific roles have not been detailed publicly.

The acronyms refer to different parts of the drone ecosystem:

• UAS (Unmanned Aircraft System): any unmanned aircraft plus its control system, communication links, and other supporting equipment. This is the broad umbrella term.
• sUAS (small Unmanned Aircraft System): a UAS whose aircraft weighs less than 55 pounds at takeoff, including everything onboard. In practice this covers most consumer, hobbyist, and many commercial quadcopter‑type drones.
• C‑UAS (Counter‑Unmanned Aircraft Systems): technologies, tactics, and organizations used to detect, track, identify, and mitigate (e.g., disable, divert, or destroy) unmanned aircraft that pose a threat. So UAS/sUAS describe the drones themselves and their control systems, while C‑UAS refers to the tools and efforts aimed at defending against them.

In U.S. airspace, drones are treated as aircraft and are primarily regulated by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), while only a few federal departments have explicit statutory authority to “counter” (detect, track, or physically/technically mitigate) them:

• FAA: Regulates all civil UAS operations (e.g., under 14 C.F.R. Part 107), manages the National Airspace System, and works with other agencies to ensure any counter‑UAS actions don’t endanger other aircraft or interfere with navigation and communications.
• General limits: Existing criminal and communications laws (e.g., prohibitions on destroying aircraft, hacking, or radio‑frequency jamming) mean that state/local agencies and private entities generally may not shoot down, jam, or seize control of drones. A 2020 joint advisory from DOJ, FAA, DHS, and FCC warns that many detection and mitigation techniques can violate federal law if used without specific authorization.
• Specialized federal authorities: The Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018 (6 U.S.C. 124n) gives DHS and DOJ limited authority—subject to conditions, approvals, and FAA coordination—to detect, track, and mitigate UAS that pose credible threats to certain “covered facilities or assets” (such as specific federal sites or security events). Separate statutes give DoD and DOE similar authorities for designated defense and nuclear facilities. These authorities are narrow, time‑limited unless renewed by Congress, and heavily conditioned by requirements to coordinate with the FAA and protect privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties.

“C‑UAS kinetic mitigation testing” means testing counter‑drone systems that physically damage, disable, or destroy a drone (as opposed to only detecting it or disrupting its radio link). DHS S&T’s North Dakota events and later kinetic demonstrations evaluated:

• Projectile or firearm‑based systems (including specialized munitions fired from rifles or other launchers) designed to hit or fragment the drone.
• Net‑based systems that physically ensnare a drone, sometimes deployed from another drone.
• Directed‑energy weapons such as high‑power microwave systems and lasers that can burn, overload, or otherwise disable a drone’s electronics.
• Drone‑on‑drone “suicide” or intercept drones that ram or drop entangling materials on hostile drones. The tests focus not only on whether these systems can defeat drones but also on their “collateral effects”—for example, where debris falls and what risks that poses to people and property in different environments.

Public documents indicate that data sharing and situational‑awareness improvements for C‑UAS are being implemented within a legal and policy framework designed to protect privacy and civil liberties:

• DHS’s C‑UAS Privacy Impact Assessment states that data from C‑UAS sensors must be limited to what is necessary for security purposes, with rules on use, retention, and sharing of any personally identifiable information (PII), plus auditing and access controls.
• DOJ guidance on UAS use requires components to assess privacy and civil‑liberties impacts before using sensors, and to collect, retain, and disseminate information only for authorized purposes.
• The domestic C‑UAS national action plan and related legislative proposals call for stronger safeguards, such as: minimizing collection of data unrelated to a threat, strict time limits for retaining incidental information about lawful users, and oversight and transparency measures. In practice, this means that while agencies are working toward a “common air picture” that fuses radar, radio‑frequency, and other sensor data across agencies (as described by JIATF 401 leaders), they are expected to apply these policies so that shared feeds and databases focus on drone activity and mission‑relevant information and avoid unnecessary or prolonged tracking of individuals.