Treasury Secretary Bessent hosts international finance ministerial to address critical minerals supply chains

“Critical minerals” are minerals and metals that are essential for a country’s economy and national security but have supply chains that are at higher risk of disruption (for example because production or processing is concentrated in a few countries). The U.S. Geological Survey defines them this way and keeps an official U.S. list of such minerals.

“Rare earth elements” (REEs) are a specific group of 17 metals often treated as critical minerals because they’re vital for magnets, electronics, clean energy, and defense:

• The 15 lanthanides: lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium
• Plus: scandium and yttrium

These 17 together are what policymakers usually mean by “rare earth elements.”

Critical mineral supply chains are vulnerable mainly because production and processing are highly concentrated in a small number of countries, and demand is rising quickly for clean energy, electronics, and defense. This concentration means any problem in a key country can cause global shortages or price spikes.

Policymakers worry about disruptions from:

• Geopolitics and export controls (e.g., a major producer restricting exports for political leverage)
• Trade disputes, sanctions, or embargoes
• Natural disasters, accidents, or technical failures at major mines, refineries, or ports
• Environmental or social incidents that shut down projects (e.g., pollution problems, local protests, or new regulations)
• Market manipulation by dominant suppliers that could withhold supply or undercut competitors to keep control of the market

U.S. government and expert analyses explicitly describe critical minerals as essential but with supply chains “vulnerable to disruption” and highlight risks from concentration and geopolitical shocks.

In policy terms, “de‑risking over decoupling” means:

• Do not try to completely cut economic ties with a major supplier country (no full “decoupling”). Trade and investment continue.
• Instead, reduce specific vulnerabilities by:
  • Diversifying suppliers and processing locations so no single country can choke off supply
  • Limiting dependence in especially sensitive areas (e.g., certain defense‑related inputs or critical minerals processing)
  • Tightening screening of risky investments, exports, and technologies

The European Union, for example, describes “de‑risking, not decoupling” from China as reducing critical dependencies and vulnerabilities in supply chains (including for raw materials) while keeping overall economic relations open. Bessent’s statement in the article reflects the same approach for critical minerals: spread the risk rather than try to wall off entire economies from each other.

Public U.S. actions to secure critical minerals supply chains fall into three broad buckets: building domestic capacity, using defense and energy authorities, and pushing international partnerships.

Key examples already announced:

1. Domestic mining and processing support

• The U.S. Geological Survey maintains and updates the official List of Critical Minerals to guide policy and investment.
• The Department of Energy (DOE) runs a Critical Minerals and Materials Program to increase domestic production, processing, and recycling of critical minerals through R&D and pilot projects.

2. Use of Defense Production Act and federal financing

• The Defense Production Act (DPA) has been invoked to support domestic supply chains for large‑capacity batteries and their critical minerals (like lithium, nickel, cobalt, graphite, and manganese), enabling federal funding and purchasing commitments for mining, processing, and battery materials.
• DOE has announced nearly $1 billion in planned funding opportunities to strengthen U.S. critical minerals and materials supply chains, including refining, processing, and recycling projects.

3. International coordination and financing tools

• The U.S. leads the Minerals Security Partnership (MSP) with allied countries to support “diverse and sustainable critical energy minerals supply chains,” including by coordinating diplomatic backing and financing for strategic mining and processing projects abroad.
• The Export‑Import Bank of the United States (EXIM) has launched a Supply Chain Resiliency Initiative and specialized financing tools to support critical-mineral and rare‑earth projects outside China, aiming to diversify supply.

The Treasury press release notes that the United States “highlighted actions and investments it has already undertaken, as well as planned steps to create resilient, secure, and diversified critical minerals supply chains,” and the examples above are the main pillars of that agenda.

Scott K.H. Bessent is the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury. He was sworn in as the 79th Treasury Secretary on January 28, 2025, and serves as the head of the Department of the Treasury, which oversees federal finances, economic and financial policy, and many international financial engagements.

In this article, he is acting in that role by convening finance ministers to coordinate policies on securing and diversifying critical minerals supply chains.

These institutions each influence supply chains from a different angle:

1. U.S. Trade Representative (USTR)

• Shapes trade policy and agreements to make supply chains more resilient, for example by:
  • Negotiating trade deals and critical-minerals arrangements with allies
  • Addressing unfair trade practices and export restrictions that threaten supplies
• USTR describes its role as adapting trade policy to support resilient and secure supply chains.

2. Export‑Import Bank of the United States (EXIM)

• Provides government-backed loans, guarantees, and insurance to support U.S.-linked projects abroad.
• EXIM has created a Supply Chain Resiliency Initiative and a dedicated financing tool to support critical mineral and rare‑earth projects outside China, explicitly aimed at diversifying and strengthening these supply chains and “reducing reliance on the PRC for critical minerals and rare earth elements.”

3. Private banks (e.g., JP Morgan)

• Provide commercial project finance, underwriting, and investment banking services for mining, processing, and manufacturing projects.
• Their participation signals to governments what projects are bankable and helps mobilize much larger pools of private capital than public funds alone can provide, which is essential because critical‑minerals projects are capital‑intensive and long‑term.

At the ministerial described in the article, USTR, EXIM’s chair, and a JP Morgan managing director presented how their tools and financing can support the push to secure and diversify supply chains.

Finance ministers can coordinate several concrete actions internationally to strengthen critical minerals supply chains. Examples already being used in G7 and allied forums include:

1. Joint investment and financing tools

• Create or expand coordinated loan and guarantee programs (through national development banks, EXIM-type agencies, and multilateral development banks) to finance new or expanded mines, refineries, and recycling plants in multiple countries.
• Prioritize projects that diversify supply away from single dominant producers and meet high environmental and labor standards.

2. Common strategies and action plans

• Agree on shared plans like the G7 Critical Minerals Action Plan, which commits countries to diversify supply, support responsible mining and processing, and improve transparency in critical minerals markets.
• Align national critical-minerals strategies so that public funding, trade policy, and R&D support are pulling in the same direction.

3. Partnerships with resource-rich countries

• Use coordinated diplomacy and financing (for example, via the Minerals Security Partnership) to help resource-rich countries develop their deposits in ways that benefit local economies and global supply security.

4. Data, standards, and risk monitoring

• Share data on demand forecasts, stockpiles, and supply disruptions, and jointly monitor risks of export controls or market manipulation.
• Develop common standards for environmental, social, and governance (ESG) performance so investments flow to responsible projects.

5. Trade and regulatory coordination

• Work with trade ministers to reduce unnecessary tariffs and non-tariff barriers on critical minerals and processing equipment among trusted partners.
• Coordinate investment screening and export controls in sensitive areas so measures to protect security do not unintentionally worsen shortages.

These types of coordinated steps are consistent with what G7 and partner countries have already endorsed and with the kind of “prudent derisking” Bessent urged at the ministerial.