Restricting and Limiting the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States

Proclamation 10949 (June 4, 2025), titled “Restricting the Entry of Foreign Nationals To Protect the United States From Foreign Terrorists and Other National Security and Public Safety Threats,” is a Trump proclamation issued under INA 212(f) that reinstated and expanded earlier “travel ban”‑style entry suspensions on nationals of certain countries judged to have poor identity‑management, vetting, or information‑sharing practices.

The new December 16, 2025 proclamation (“Restricting and Limiting the Entry of Foreign Nationals to Protect the Security of the United States”) builds on 10949 rather than replacing it. It:

• Formally continues the full and partial entry suspensions created in sections 2 and 3 of Proclamation 10949 for 19 countries.
• Modifies those earlier restrictions (for example, narrowing exceptions, changing what kinds of visas are blocked, and lifting some nonimmigrant limits on Turkmenistan).
• Adds new countries and categories (e.g., Burkina Faso, Laos, Mali, Niger, Sierra Leone, South Sudan, Syria, several Citizenship‑by‑Investment states, and holders of Palestinian Authority travel documents) to the full or partial suspension lists.
• Keeps Proclamation 10949’s framework of using periodic inter‑agency review to recommend whether to continue, change, or lift restrictions.

In short, 10949 created the current travel‑restriction regime; the December 2025 proclamation is a follow‑on update that tightens, expands, and in some cases adjusts those rules while leaving 10949 in force where not expressly modified or superseded.

The proclamation relies mainly on three U.S. legal authorities:

1. INA §212(f), codified at 8 U.S.C. 1182(f) – This gives the President very broad power to suspend or restrict the entry of “any aliens or of any class of aliens” whenever he “finds that the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States,” and to do so “by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary.” The Supreme Court in Trump v. Hawaii held that this provision grants the President “broad discretion” to impose such entry bans.

2. INA §215(a), codified at 8 U.S.C. 1185(a) – This allows the President to prescribe “reasonable rules, regulations, and orders” governing the departure and entry of aliens (and, in some circumstances, U.S. citizens), including “limitations and exceptions,” which supports setting conditions on who may enter or leave.

3. 3 U.S.C. §301 – A general statute letting the President delegate his statutory functions to other executive officials (such as the Secretaries of State or Homeland Security), which is why the proclamation authorizes those officials to implement suspensions and grant exceptions.

The December 16, 2025 proclamation explicitly cites INA §§212(f) and 215(a) and 3 U.S.C. 301 as the legal basis for declaring that entry of the covered classes of foreign nationals is detrimental to U.S. interests and should be restricted, subject to defined exceptions and waivers.

The DHS Entry/Exit Overstay Report is an annual report by U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) that estimates, for each country, how many nonimmigrant visitors who were expected to leave the U.S. in a fiscal year actually overstayed their authorized period of admission.

Key points:

• It covers specific visa classes, including B‑1/B‑2 (visitors for business/pleasure) and F, M, J (students, vocational students, and exchange visitors).
• CBP uses its Arrival and Departure Information System (ADIS), airline and border records, and DHS/State data to match each entry with a departure or other status update.

How overstay rates are calculated (per the DHS methodology):

• For each country and visa category, CBP defines:
  • Expected departures = the number of nonimmigrant visitors whose authorized stay ended during the fiscal year.
  • Suspected in‑country overstays = people with no record of timely departure or change/extension of status after their authorized period.
  • Out‑of‑country overstays = people who left the U.S., but after their authorized stay expired.
• The total overstay rate is generally:
  (Suspected in‑country overstays + out‑of‑country overstays) ÷ expected departures × 100%.
  DHS also often reports a separate “suspected in‑country overstay rate” using just the first numerator.

In this proclamation, the cited overstay percentages for each country (e.g., Burkina Faso’s 9.16% B‑1/B‑2 overstay rate and 22.95% F/M/J rate) are taken directly from recent Entry/Exit Overstay Reports and are one factor—among others like vetting quality and cooperation on removals—used to justify imposing or tightening entry suspensions.

Citizenship by Investment (CBI) programs are government‑run schemes where foreign nationals can obtain a country’s citizenship—and a passport—by making a qualifying investment (often in real estate, government bonds, or a fund), sometimes without living in that country.

The proclamation flags CBI as a screening and vetting risk for several reasons:

• A person from a country subject to U.S. travel restrictions can buy citizenship in a second country that has a CBI program and no U.S. ban, then apply for a U.S. visa on that new passport to evade the original restriction.
• U.S. law‑enforcement and State Department reporting cited in the proclamation say CBI programs have historically been vulnerable to abuse by criminals and corrupt officials seeking to hide their identity, move illicit funds, or circumvent sanctions and travel controls.
• Poor due‑diligence standards or corruption in some CBI programs can mean that the issuing government has weak or unreliable information on the true identity, background, or criminal history of the new “citizen,” undermining U.S. consular vetting.

These concerns are broadly consistent with independent risk assessments. For example, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) has warned that CBI/residency‑by‑investment schemes can be misused for money‑laundering, sanctions evasion, and other financial crimes if due diligence is weak.

For these reasons, the proclamation treats countries with “CBI without residency” as higher risk and, for some (like Dominica and Antigua and Barbuda), imposes partial entry suspensions linked directly to their CBI programs.

Under this proclamation, national‑interest exceptions (waivers) are tightly controlled and can be granted only on a case‑by‑case basis for individuals who otherwise fall under the entry suspensions.

Who can grant them (Section 6(d)–(f)):

• Attorney General (AG) – may approve an exception when the person’s travel would advance “a critical United States national interest involving the Department of Justice,” for example, appearing in U.S. criminal proceedings as a witness. The AG (or a designee) must coordinate with the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security.
• Secretary of State (or designee) – may approve an exception when, in his discretion, the travel “would serve a United States national interest,” coordinating with the Secretary of Homeland Security (or designee).
• Secretary of Homeland Security (or designee) – may similarly approve an exception based on U.S. national interest, coordinating with the Secretary of State (or designee).

How they work in practice:

• The proclamation does not create a public application form; in practice, waivers are typically considered during visa adjudication or border screening when a consular or CBP officer identifies a potentially qualifying case and forwards it for high‑level decision.
• The decision is discretionary—even if a case arguably serves U.S. interests, the AG, Secretary of State, or Secretary of Homeland Security (or their designees) may still deny an exception.
• Past practice under similar travel bans (e.g., Presidential Proclamation 9645) shows that:
  • Waivers are rare relative to the number of affected applicants.
  • They often require detailed justification, security vetting, and inter‑agency coordination.
  • If granted during visa processing, the visa is annotated or otherwise marked to show that the individual is excepted from the proclamation for that trip or for the visa’s validity period, subject to other immigration laws.

The December 2025 proclamation explicitly states that these national‑interest exceptions are the mechanism for handling “extraordinary cases” that do not fit within the narrowed categorical exceptions.

The proclamation’s scope and exceptions (Section 6 and Section 8) explain how it affects different groups:

1. Who is covered by the suspensions (Section 6(a))
   The entry limits apply only to nationals of the listed countries who:

   • Are outside the United States on the effective date (12:01 a.m. EST, January 1, 2026), and
   • Do not have a valid visa on that date.

2. Lawful Permanent Residents (green‑card holders)

   • Explicitly excepted: “any lawful permanent resident of the United States” is not subject to the suspension (Section 6(b)(i)).
   • They may still face normal inspection at the border but are not banned by this proclamation.

3. Dual nationals

   • A dual national of a listed country is excepted when traveling on a passport from a non‑listed country (Section 6(b)(ii)).
   • If they choose to travel on the passport of the restricted country, they are treated as covered nationals and are subject to the applicable suspension unless a waiver applies.

4. Refugees and people granted asylum

   • Section 8(d) states the proclamation “shall not apply to an individual who has been granted asylum” by the U.S. or to a refugee who has already been admitted.
   • It also says nothing in the proclamation limits anyone’s ability to seek asylum, refugee status, withholding of removal, or Convention Against Torture protection under U.S. law.
   • So: existing asylees/refugees in the U.S. are unaffected; new claims can still be filed and must be processed under normal asylum/refugee procedures.

5. People who already hold valid visas on the effective date

   • By definition (Section 6(a)(ii)), they fall outside the classes subject to suspension.
   • Section 8(c) adds: “No immigrant or nonimmigrant visa issued before the applicable effective date of this proclamation shall be revoked pursuant to this proclamation.”
   • That means a valid visa issued before January 1, 2026 is not cancelled by this proclamation, and holders may continue to use it, subject to all other immigration laws and usual inspection.

6. People applying for visas now or in the future

   • If they are nationals of a fully suspended country, consular officers generally cannot issue immigrant or nonimmigrant visas in the covered categories after the effective date, unless a categorical exception or national‑interest exception applies.
   • For partially suspended countries, consular officers are barred from issuing certain visa types (e.g., B‑1/B‑2, F, M, J) and must shorten the validity of other nonimmigrant visas “to the extent permitted by law” (Section 5), again unless a case‑by‑case exception is approved.

Overall, lawful permanent residents, qualifying dual nationals, certain diplomatic/official visa holders, specified athletes, some special immigrants, persecuted minorities from Iran, and already‑admitted refugees/asylees are carved out, while new visa seekers from the listed countries are broadly blocked unless they fit an exception or receive a high‑level national‑interest waiver.

For U.S. consulates and visa applicants, the proclamation has several operational effects:

1. Mandatory non‑issuance in covered categories

   • For countries under a full suspension (Sections 2 & 4), consular officers must refuse immigrant and nonimmigrant visas to nationals of those countries, except for:
     • People who fall under categorical exceptions (e.g., LPRs, certain diplomatic/NATO visas, specified athletes, some special immigrants, persecuted minorities from Iran), or
     • Individuals granted a case‑by‑case national‑interest exception by the AG, Secretary of State, or Secretary of Homeland Security.

2. Restricted categories and shortened validity for partially suspended countries

   • For 15 countries listed in Section 5(a)–(p) and the previously partially restricted countries, consular officers:
     • May not issue B‑1/B‑2 (visitors), F/M/J (students and exchange visitors), and in some cases other specified categories to nationals of those countries.
     • Are instructed to “reduce the validity for any other nonimmigrant visa” issued to those nationals “to the extent permitted by law” (Section 5(ii)–(iii) for each country). In practice, this means:
       • Shorter visa validity periods than normal reciprocity would allow.
       • Possibly limiting entries to single‑ or few‑entry visas rather than multi‑year, multiple‑entry visas.

3. Timing and pending applications

   • The proclamation applies based on visa status at the effective date:
     • If a visa is issued before 12:01 a.m. EST on January 1, 2026, it is not revoked by this proclamation (Section 8(c)).
     • If a case is still pending on or after the effective date, consular officers must apply the new rules. Applicants from covered countries whose visas have not yet been issued generally will be refused in barred categories unless an exception/waiver is granted.

4. Consular workload and procedures

   • Posts handling affected nationalities must:
     • Update internal adjudication guidance and interview scripts to reflect the new bans and exceptions.
     • Implement processes to identify potential national‑interest exception cases and forward them to Washington or designated senior officials for decision.
     • Adjust visa reciprocity schedules and printing systems so that permitted nonimmigrant visas for partially restricted countries automatically carry reduced validity.

5. Travelers currently applying

   • Applicants from listed countries should expect:
     • Higher rates of outright refusal for B‑1/B‑2, F, M, J, and all immigrant visas where a full suspension applies.
     • For non‑barred visa types (e.g., certain work visas) in partially restricted countries, visas—if issued—will often be valid for much shorter periods than normal.
     • No automatic right to a waiver; national‑interest exceptions are discretionary and typically rare.

These operational changes mirror how consulates implemented earlier travel bans such as Presidential Proclamation 9645, where consular officers applied categorical bars first and then considered waivers only in exceptional, well‑documented cases.

The 180‑day review process is laid out in Section 7 of the proclamation and is modeled on earlier travel‑ban frameworks:

How it operates

• Within 180 days of December 16, 2025, and every 180 days thereafter, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Attorney General, Secretary of Homeland Security, and Director of National Intelligence, must submit a report to the President (through the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security).
• The report must recommend for each covered country whether the current entry suspensions and limitations should be continued, terminated, modified, or supplemented (Section 7(a)).
• Separately, the Secretary of State (with DOJ, DHS, and DNI) must continue or begin diplomatic engagement with each listed country on “measures that must be taken to comply with screening, vetting, immigration, and security requirements of the United States” (Section 7(b)).

Metrics and benchmarks likely used The proclamation does not publish numerical targets, but it describes the factors the President and agencies already used and will reassess for each review (Section 1(f), 1(k)), including:

• Identity‑management and documentation quality – whether the country can reliably issue and safeguard passports and civil documents (birth, marriage, etc.) and prevent document fraud.
• Information‑sharing practices – whether the country shares relevant data with the U.S. on known or suspected terrorists and criminals and provides passport exemplars and criminal records.
• Security environment and terrorist presence – whether parts of the country are controlled by the government, the extent of terrorist or criminal group activity, and the impact on vetting.
• Visa‑overstay rates – B‑1/B‑2 and F/M/J overstay rates from DHS Entry/Exit Overstay Reports (high or rising rates weigh against lifting restrictions).
• Cooperation on removals – whether the country accepts back its removable nationals when the U.S. seeks to deport them.
• Corruption and fraud levels – including the integrity of civil registries, law‑enforcement records, and any Citizenship‑by‑Investment programs.

If, in future 180‑day reviews, a country shows sustained improvement on these benchmarks—such as implementing secure passports, sharing data consistently, reducing overstay rates, and cooperating on removals—the inter‑agency report can recommend easing or lifting its restrictions. Conversely, continued deficiencies or deterioration can justify maintaining or even expanding the suspensions.