Response to China’s Military Exercise Near Taiwan

The statement is responding to China’s late‑December 2025 large‑scale People’s Liberation Army (PLA) war games around Taiwan, code‑named “Justice Mission 2025.” These drills involved:

• Simulated seizure and blockade of Taiwan’s key areas and ports (Keelung in the north, Kaohsiung in the south)
• 10 hours of live‑fire exercises with long‑range rockets into waters north and south of Taiwan
• Large numbers of PLA aircraft, warships, and other vessels encircling the island and crossing the Taiwan Strait’s median line. The State Department press release itself mentions only “China’s military activities and rhetoric toward Taiwan,” but these Justice Mission 2025 drills were the major exercise immediately preceding the January 1, 2026 statement and are widely reported as such.

China’s “Justice Mission 2025” exercises took place in the waters and airspace all around Taiwan in late December 2025, just days before the January 1, 2026 U.S. statement.

• Timing: Drills began around December 29, 2025, with major live‑fire exercises on December 30, lasting roughly 10 hours.
• Location relative to Taiwan: PLA forces operated to the north, south, east, and southwest of the main island, including zones that simulated blockades of the northern port of Keelung and southern port of Kaohsiung, and encirclement of Taiwan. Taiwan’s defense ministry reported rockets landing in waters near the island and many PLA aircraft crossing the Taiwan Strait’s median line and entering Taiwan’s air defense identification zone.

When U.S. officials say they support the “status quo across the Taiwan Strait,” they mean keeping the current basic situation:

• Taiwan continues to govern itself democratically without being ruled by Beijing, but without a formal U.S.-backed declaration of Taiwanese independence.
• The People’s Republic of China does not try to change this situation by force or coercion (for example, by invasion or blockade). The U.S. urges both sides not to take unilateral steps—such as a forced unification by China or a formal independence move by Taiwan—that would upset this balance and threaten peace and stability.

In this context “military pressure” refers to a broad set of PLA actions designed to intimidate or coerce Taiwan without an outright war, including:

• Large‑scale exercises like “Justice Mission 2025” that encircle Taiwan and simulate blockades and strikes on key infrastructure and ports
• Live‑fire drills and rocket or missile launches into waters near Taiwan
• Frequent fighter, bomber, drone, and other aircraft sorties across the Taiwan Strait’s median line and into Taiwan’s air defense identification zone
• PLA Navy and coast guard ships operating close to Taiwan, including around its outlying islands, to demonstrate the ability to restrict shipping and apply sustained pressure. These activities are what the U.S. is urging Beijing to “cease” in its statement.

Thomas “Tommy” Pigott is the Principal Deputy Spokesperson for the U.S. Department of State. In this role, he is a senior official in the Office of the Spokesperson responsible for helping lead the department’s public communications and serving as a key on‑the‑record voice on U.S. foreign policy—including issuing press statements like this one and sometimes briefing the press in place of or alongside the main State Department Spokesperson.

Publicly, the U.S. does not spell out a fixed list of “next steps,” but based on established policy and recent practice, concrete measures it can take if China continues such activities include:

• Diplomatic: Issuing further public statements; coordinating joint condemnations with allies and partners; raising the issue in international forums (e.g., G7, UN); and expanding high‑level visits or contacts with Taiwan.
• Military: Increasing U.S. naval and air presence and transits in the Taiwan Strait and nearby waters; more exercises with regional allies (Japan, Philippines, Australia, etc.); and enhancing intelligence sharing with Taiwan.
• Security & economic: Accelerating and expanding arms sales and security assistance to Taiwan; tightening export controls on technologies that support China’s military; and using targeted sanctions in response to coercive behavior. These kinds of steps have been used or signaled by Washington in response to past PLA escalations around Taiwan.