An “additional ad valorem rate of duty of 25 percent” is a tariff equal to 25% of the customs value of the imported good that importers must pay to U.S. Customs and Border Protection on top of any existing duties. Practically, importers pay 25% more at entry (unless an exception applies); U.S. firms that buy those imports as inputs face higher costs; and consumers typically face higher retail prices to the extent businesses pass the tariff through (studies show partial-to-near-complete pass‑through over time). The EO that imposed the 25% also states it is in addition to other duties (i.e., “stacking”).
Executive Order 14024 (Apr 15, 2021) declared a national emergency and authorized blocking sanctions and related restrictions on persons and activities tied to harmful Russian foreign activities. EO 14066 (Mar 8, 2022) expanded export/import restrictions and prohibited certain imports and new U.S. investments tied to Russia (including bans on some Russian energy imports). EO 14329 (Aug 6, 2025) built on those authorities and imposed an additional 25% ad valorem duty on articles of India because the U.S. found India was directly or indirectly importing Russian oil. The 2026 action lifts that 25% duty after India’s commitments.
The 25% duty under EO 14329 applied to “articles of India” broadly (i.e., imports from India) rather than a limited list of product lines; implementation used country-specific HTS US provisions under chapter 99. HTS headings 9903.01.84–9903.01.89 and subdivision (z) of U.S. Note 2 to subchapter III of chapter 99 were the tariff schedule entries that implemented the EO’s India ad valorem rate; the White House 2026 action terminates those HTS entries. The EO text treats the tariff as applying to articles of India except specified statutory exceptions, so the coverage was essentially all goods of Indian origin subject to HTS classification (as implemented by CBP/HTS notices).
Monitoring is led by Commerce (coordinating with State, Treasury, Homeland Security, and others). Agencies will use trade data, customs records, tanker/ship-tracking and port transaction information, trade statistics from U.S. and international sources, and diplomatic engagement to determine if India is directly or indirectly importing Russian oil. A finding that India is directly or indirectly importing Russian Federation oil (as defined in EO 14329) would trigger interagency recommendations to the President about reimposing the duty. The EO explicitly assigns Commerce to determine imports and instructs State to consult and recommend actions if such imports are found.
EO 14329 defines “Russian Federation oil” (Section 7(a)) as “crude oil or petroleum products extracted, refined, or exported from the Russian Federation, regardless of the nationality of the entity involved,” and Section 7(b) defines “indirectly importing” to include purchases through intermediaries or third countries where the origin can reasonably be traced to Russia, as determined by the Secretary of Commerce in consultation with State and Treasury. The definition appears verbatim in Section 7 of EO 14329.
If refunds are required, they will be processed under applicable law and standard U.S. Customs and Border Protection procedures: importers (or parties that paid the duties) may file a protest or a request for refund/adjustment with CBP following liquidation or pursuant to CBP guidance; eligible claimants typically are the importer of record or party that paid the duties. CBP processes duty refunds under 19 U.S.C. and its regulations; the EO directs agencies to implement refunds consistent with law and CBP practice.
The White House statement says India committed to (1) stop directly or indirectly importing Russian oil, (2) purchase U.S. energy products, and (3) expand bilateral defense cooperation with the U.S. over the next 10 years. The public White House release and EO do not attach binding treaty texts; such commitments are described as political/diplomatic commitments and would generally be implemented through memoranda, commercial agreements, or follow‑on government-to-government arrangements—not automatically legally binding U.S. domestic law obligations. Whether specific commercial purchases or defense cooperation arrangements are legally binding depends on the underlying agreements (which were not published in the EO).