In this context, the “defense industrial base” means the broad network of companies, facilities, and supporting organizations that research, design, produce, deliver, and maintain military weapons, equipment, and related services for the U.S. Department of Defense. It includes big “prime” contractors (like major arms and shipbuilding firms), thousands of smaller suppliers and subcontractors, and some government‑owned facilities that keep U.S. forces equipped and able to operate.
“Defense industrial workers” generally refers to the people employed across that defense industrial base. That primarily means private‑sector employees at major defense contractors and their subcontractors and suppliers (engineers, machinists, welders, technicians, logistics staff, etc.), but also includes workers in government‑owned/contractor‑operated or government‑owned/government‑operated plants that produce or support military systems and services for the Pentagon.
“Secretary of War” is a newly authorized secondary title, not a separate, traditional cabinet department. Pete Hegseth is the 29th U.S. Secretary of Defense; a September 5, 2025 executive order by President Donald Trump authorized the secretary of defense, the department, and subordinates to use the alternative titles “Secretary of War” and “Department of War.” In practice, Hegseth is the Secretary of Defense, branded and frequently referred to as the Secretary of War under that order.
Based on publicly available coverage of this tour, the Pentagon framed it as a push to “rebuild the arsenal of freedom” and support defense manufacturing, but did not roll out detailed, tour‑specific investment programs with line‑item funding in the Fort Worth stop. Hegseth pointed to President Trump’s earlier announcement that the defense budget would rise by more than 50% to about $1.5 trillion in 2027, and he tied that increase to expanding weapons production. He also highlighted a new Trump executive order (issued January 7, 2026) restricting stock buybacks and dividends for underperforming defense contractors as a key policy change affecting industry incentives. Beyond those previously announced budget and policy moves, reports on this stop do not describe new, concrete Pentagon investment programs being formally launched during the tour event itself.
The phrase about an industrial base “loyal to supporting America’s service members and civilians who support the Constitution” is political and rhetorical rather than a clearly defined legal standard. Existing U.S. law and defense contracts already require companies to follow federal law, uphold constitutional rights (e.g., nondiscrimination, labor and procurement laws), meet security vetting rules, and comply with contract performance and ethics clauses. There is no publicly available evidence of a new formal Pentagon rulebook that ties contract eligibility directly to ideological tests like “supporting the Constitution” beyond these long‑standing legal and contractual compliance requirements; instead, Hegseth’s language appears to frame those existing obligations in explicitly political terms.
Coverage of this stop on Hegseth’s “Arsenal of Freedom” tour shows that he visited Lockheed Martin’s F‑35 production facility at Air Force Plant 4 in Fort Worth, Texas, where he addressed roughly 1,000 plant employees involved in building the F‑35 Lightning II fighter. The broader tour, according to separate reporting and official releases, also includes visits to major shipyards in Newport News, Virginia, and to aerospace and space‑launch facilities such as SpaceX in Brownsville, Texas, to engage shipbuilders, aerospace workers, and other defense‑manufacturing employees. The restricted war.gov article itself is not accessible, so additional specific stops or worker groups it may mention cannot be confirmed from open sources.
