The BTA is the planned comprehensive bilateral trade pact the U.S. and India are negotiating to cover tariffs, goods and services market access, investment, IP, labor, environment, digital trade and other trade rules. The Interim Agreement (also called an “early‑harvest” or interim trade arrangement) is a narrower, quicker set of commitments (e.g., tariff cuts, market access or other provisions) that both sides implement immediately while they continue negotiating the full BTA; WTO rules (Article XXIV) recognize such interim agreements as lawful steps toward a free‑trade area or customs union.
Here it refers to an additional, country‑specific ad valorem duty the U.S. imposes unilaterally to ‘‘equalize’’ or respond to non‑reciprocal foreign tariff practices. It is separate from routine MFN/HTSUS tariffs: reciprocal tariffs are an extra, negotiable charge set by executive action under the President’s emergency/trade authorities and can be changed as part of deals (e.g., U.S. lowered India’s reciprocal rate from 25% to 18%).
The White House fact sheet does not specify a time period for the ‘‘over $500 billion’’ purchase commitment; no timeframe is given in the joint fact sheet/joint statement.
Non‑tariff barriers (NTBs) are non‑tax measures that restrict trade or limit market access—examples include restrictive licensing, quotas, discriminatory standards/regulations, burdensome conformity assessment procedures, sanitary/phytosanitary rules that lack scientific basis, limits on cross‑border data flows, and discriminatory treatment of foreign firms or state‑owned enterprises. To address NTBs India would need to change policies such as discriminatory licensing or procurement rules, simplify customs and conformity procedures, revise technical/regulatory standards and SPS measures to meet international scientific standards, and remove measures that block data flows or discriminate against foreign digital services.
A digital services tax (DST) is a levy some countries impose on revenues earned by digital companies from online advertising, digital marketplaces, or user‑generated data. Removing India’s DST would lower tax costs and regulatory uncertainty for U.S. tech firms selling digital services in India and could reduce prices or compliance costs for consumers; it also clears the way for bilateral digital‑trade rules (e.g., prohibiting customs duties on electronic transmissions and enabling cross‑border data flows).
Rules of origin are the criteria used to determine where a product ‘‘originates’’ for purposes of a trade preference or tariff treatment (e.g., wholly obtained, sufficient regional value‑content or a change in tariff classification). They matter because only goods that meet the origin rules qualify for preferential/zero tariffs under an agreement; strict ROO prevent transshipment or third‑country content from improperly receiving preferential rates.
Practically, cooperation on inbound/outbound investment reviews and export controls means aligning or coordinating the procedures countries use to screen foreign investments (for national‑security risks), sharing information and best practices, and harmonizing export control lists and licensing processes for sensitive technologies so that restricted items (e.g., advanced semiconductors, defense‑related tech, dual‑use goods) are blocked consistently and supply‑chain risks are managed jointly.
Verification would rely on a mix of customs and trade data, import/export filings, energy trade statistics, certification/attestation requirements, on‑site inspections and information‑sharing between governments and private firms. Enforcement can use tariff adjustments (reinstating higher reciprocal rates), customs penalties, sanctions, or contract clauses; the fact sheet ties tariff relief to India’s oil purchases but does not detail a specific verification/enforcement mechanism.