You can read the full, legally operative text of the Executive Order—Executive Order 14369, “Ensuring American Space Superiority”—at these official sites:
• White House: HTML publication of the order • Federal Register: official legal version with citation 90 Fed. Reg. 60537 (Dec. 23, 2025); includes section-by-section text and notes on prior orders it supersedes.
Both versions state it is issued “by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America,” which is the standard legal formula for presidential executive orders grounded in Article II and existing statutes governing the executive branch and federal agencies.
The Executive Order does not name specific builders or operators for the Moon and orbital reactors or spell out detailed safety rules. It instead tells the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (APST) to create a “National Initiative for American Space Nuclear Power” to coordinate agencies on this work.
Based on existing U.S. programs, the likely pattern is: • Lead federal agencies: NASA and the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) already co-lead the Fission Surface Power project to design a 40‑kW lunar fission reactor, with Idaho National Laboratory managing contracts. • Current commercial partners: Lockheed Martin (with BWXT, Creare), Westinghouse (with Aerojet Rocketdyne), and IX (a joint venture of Intuitive Machines and X‑energy, with Maxar and Boeing) hold Phase 1 design contracts for a lunar reactor concept. • Safety and legal standards: U.S. space nuclear systems must comply with national nuclear safety regulations and U.S. policy on launching nuclear power sources, and internationally with the U.N. “Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space,” which stress minimizing risk and ensuring appropriate design, testing, and operation.
However, until the APST’s new initiative and follow‑on contracts are issued, the exact organizations that will build and operate the specific EO‑directed reactors—and the detailed mission‑specific safety standards—have not yet been formally designated.
The Executive Order sets the policy goal—Americans back on the Moon by 2028 and initial elements of a permanent lunar outpost by 2030—but it does not itself appropriate money or assign every implementing detail.
From the order and current programs: • Lead program: The EO explicitly ties the 2028 landing to NASA’s Artemis Program, which is already funded through the annual congressional budget process and supplemented by Space Launch System (SLS), Orion, and Human Landing System contracts with companies such as SpaceX and Blue Origin. • Funding: As with all U.S. civil spaceflight, actual money must come from Congress via NASA’s appropriations. The EO directs NASA and the Office of Management and Budget to deliver a plan that achieves the Moon and outpost goals “within available funding,” but does not create new funding by itself. • Roles: – NASA: overall mission architecture, lunar landings, surface systems, and outpost planning under Artemis. – Commercial partners: under existing and future contracts (e.g., landers, cargo services, surface power, habitats) NASA will purchase services or hardware from private firms, following the EO’s preference for commercial solutions. – Other agencies: the order tasks the APST, Department of Commerce, and a “Secretary of War” (a renamed defense leadership post; see Q5) with related technology, industrial base, and security work, but not with leading human lunar exploration.
So the Moon return and early outpost will be primarily NASA‑led, carried out via Artemis and related contracts, and funded only to the extent Congress provides budget authority in future NASA appropriations.
The Executive Order calls for “spurring private sector initiative and a commercial pathway to replace the International Space Station by 2030” but does not itself create a specific successor station or name its owner or operator.
Current U.S. policy and programs point to this likely path: • NASA’s Commercial LEO Destinations (CLD) program is already funding private space‑station concepts from companies including Blue Origin (Orbital Reef), Voyager Space/Starlab, and Northrop Grumman, aiming to buy services rather than own the stations. • Under that model, the new stations would be owned and operated by private companies, with NASA becoming an anchor customer purchasing crew, cargo, and research services, and other governments and private users able to buy access. • Funding: The EO does not appropriate funds. NASA’s CLD work is funded via Congress; the EO reinforces a “commercial pathway” approach—preferring commercial solutions and streamlined acquisition—rather than a government‑owned ISS‑style replacement.
So, the “commercial pathway” means multiple privately owned and operated stations in low‑Earth orbit, with NASA and other users buying services from them, not a single government‑owned replacement defined by this order.
Under Section 3 of the Executive Order, the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology (APST)—essentially the President’s science adviser—is the central coordinator for carrying out the order. Key responsibilities include:
• Overall coordination: “Coordinate the overall implementation of this order,” bringing together NASA, Commerce, defense, intelligence, State, and other agencies on exploration, security, commercial, and nuclear‑power tasks. • Space nuclear power: Within 60 days, issue guidance to establish a “National Initiative for American Space Nuclear Power” to achieve the order’s nuclear‑reactor goals (including a lunar surface reactor by 2030). • Launch policy: Within 120 days, propose revisions to the existing National Space Transportation Policy (Presidential Policy Directive‑26) so it aligns with the new priorities. • Integrated planning: Within 90 days, assemble and submit to the President an integrated package of plans and reviews from NASA, the Department of Commerce, and the “Secretary of War” on exploration, acquisition reform, and missile‑defense‑related technology and industrial‑base gaps.
In short, the APST is the White House lead who turns the policy goals in the order into coordinated agency plans and timelines, especially for space nuclear power and broader space‑policy alignment.
The “Secretary of War” referenced in the Executive Order is not a newly created cabinet department separate from the Pentagon. It is the title this administration is using in place of “Secretary of Defense” for the civilian head of the Department of Defense (DoD).
Evidence: • The order assigns the “Secretary of War” tasks that are normally DoD responsibilities—reviewing technology, supply‑chain, and industrial‑base gaps for air and missile defenses and working with the National Security Advisor and Director of National Intelligence on a space security strategy. • Public reporting on the order describes it as a space‑policy directive that spans NASA’s civil space role and national security space, including missile defense and space‑security architecture—areas historically overseen by DoD and the U.S. Space Force. • The U.S. Space Force is a military service within DoD; under this naming convention, it would remain under the authority of the “Secretary of War,” just as it is now under the Secretary of Defense.
So, “Department of War” in this context is effectively a rebranding of DoD under this administration, and it stands above the Space Force in the same way the Department of Defense currently does; it is not a separate, additional department.
The Executive Order itself only states that the United States will “enable near‑term utilization of space nuclear power by deploying nuclear reactors on the Moon and in orbit,” and directs the APST to establish a National Initiative for American Space Nuclear Power. It does not spell out a legal analysis of treaty compliance, but any U.S. deployment must fit within existing international space law.
Key international rules that would apply include: • 1967 Outer Space Treaty: Requires states to use outer space for peaceful purposes; avoid harmful contamination; bear international responsibility for national activities in space; and avoid harmful interference with other states’ activities. • 1972 Liability Convention: Makes the “launching state” absolutely liable for damage on Earth and liable for damage in space caused by its space objects, including those with nuclear power sources. • 1992 U.N. “Principles Relevant to the Use of Nuclear Power Sources in Outer Space”: Non‑binding but widely followed guidelines requiring that nuclear power sources in space be designed and operated to minimize risk, meet stringent safety criteria, and be subject to appropriate safety assessments and international notification if an accident poses a risk.
In practice, compliance would mean designing the lunar and orbital reactors to meet these safety principles; conducting national and interagency safety reviews; and ensuring missions are planned so they do not contaminate the Moon or create unreasonable risks to other states’ space activities.