White House directs Commerce and USTR to negotiate agreements on imports of processed critical minerals citing national security

In this policy, “processed critical minerals and their derivative products (PCMDPs)” is a catch‑all label for two things:

1. Processed critical minerals – minerals on the official U.S. “critical minerals list” (such as lithium, cobalt, rare earth elements, graphite, etc.) after they have been refined and processed, not just dug out of the ground. The April 2025 executive order that launched the Section 232 investigation defines these as critical minerals that, after mining, have been turned into oxide concentrates, then separated into oxides, and finally converted into metals, metal powders, or master alloys.

2. Derivative products – any semi‑finished or finished goods that use those processed critical minerals as key inputs. The same order lists examples such as semiconductor wafers, battery anodes and cathodes, permanent magnets, motors, electric vehicles, batteries, smartphones, microprocessors, radar systems, wind turbines and advanced optical devices.

So PCMDPs cover both the processed forms of critical minerals themselves and the many industrial and consumer products that rely on them.

Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 is a U.S. law (19 U.S.C. § 1862) that lets the federal government restrict imports that threaten national security.

How it works and what it allows:

• Investigation: The President (or any agency head or “interested party”) can trigger an investigation by the Commerce Department into whether imports of a specific “article” are coming in under conditions that threaten to impair U.S. national security. Commerce normally has up to 270 days to report its findings and recommendations to the President.
• Presidential decision: If Commerce finds a threat, the President generally has 90 days to decide what to do and 15 more days to implement it (these timelines have sometimes been shortened or stretched in practice).
• Powers: The President may “adjust the imports” of the article and its derivatives to remove the threat. In practice, that has meant tools such as:
  • tariffs (extra import duties),
  • import quotas or other quantitative limits,
  • or negotiated agreements with trading partners that limit or manage their exports.

“National security” is defined broadly and, in past cases, has included concerns about industrial capacity, critical infrastructure, defense needs, and economic welfare related to strategic sectors like steel, aluminum, autos, and now critical minerals.

A price floor in trade is a rule or agreement that a product cannot be sold below a set minimum price. Applied to PCMDPs, the White House is signaling it wants trading partners to agree that processed critical minerals and key downstream products will not be exported or traded below an agreed minimum price.

Mechanically, such floors could be implemented through:

• international or bilateral agreements that set a minimum transaction price or reference price, and
• domestic trade measures (like tariffs, anti‑dumping rules, or minimum‑price rules at the border) to enforce that floor on imports.

The stated goals are to:

• prevent “non‑market practices” and dumping (for example, state‑subsidized producers selling below cost),
• support viable prices for U.S. and allied miners, refiners, and manufacturers, and
• reduce strategic dependence on a few low‑cost foreign suppliers by making it harder for them to undercut other producers.

In practice, price floors tend to raise or stabilize prices for producers and can help keep high‑cost domestic capacity open, but they also tend to mean higher input costs for manufacturers and, over time, potentially higher prices for end‑users.

The January 2026 fact sheet does not list specific “adversarial nations” or “foreign actors” by name. It only refers generally to “foreign actors” using “non‑market practices” and to reducing dependence on “adversarial nations.”

However, broader U.S. critical‑minerals policy and official analyses consistently identify China as the primary strategic concern because of its dominant role in processing and refining many critical minerals and rare earths. U.S. strategy documents also flag risks associated with dependence on Russia and some other authoritarian producers, but the Section 232 documents on PCMDPs themselves avoid naming particular countries.

If agreements on PCMDP imports are not reached within 180 days, the proclamation says the President “may take other actions he deems necessary to adjust imports” and remove the national‑security threat.

Under Section 232 and related authorities, that toolbox typically includes:

• Imposing tariffs (extra import duties) on some or all PCMDPs.
• Setting quotas or other quantitative limits on imports.
• Country‑specific deals that cap exports from certain countries or require minimum domestic content.
• Additional import restrictions or safeguards to prevent circumvention (for example, measures on downstream derivative products or trans‑shipped goods).
• Non‑tariff measures to boost U.S. supply, such as incentives for domestic mining, processing, and recycling, potentially using the Defense Production Act or other statutes alongside Section 232.

The 2025 executive order that launched the Section 232 investigation on PCMDPs explicitly anticipated these kinds of tariffs, import restrictions, and domestic‑production incentives as potential follow‑on measures if negotiations or voluntary arrangements prove insufficient.

The Ambler Road Project is a proposed 211‑mile industrial road in Arctic Alaska that would connect the existing Dalton Highway to the remote Ambler Mining District.

According to the October 2025 White House fact sheet, the road is intended to:

• Provide year‑round access to one of the world’s largest undeveloped copper‑zinc mineral belts, which also contains cobalt, gallium, germanium, silver, gold, lead, and other strategic metals.
• Enable transport of equipment in and ore out, unlocking more than 1,700 active mining claims in the district.
• Support thousands of construction jobs and generate future state revenues from mining taxes and royalties.

The administration explicitly links Ambler Road to its critical minerals strategy: by opening up domestic deposits in Alaska, it aims to reduce U.S. reliance on foreign suppliers (especially for copper, cobalt and related critical minerals) and strengthen supply security for energy, clean‑tech, and defense industries.

The economic effects will depend on the specific deals or tariffs adopted, but the likely channels are:

For U.S. manufacturers and defense suppliers

• Input costs: Price floors or tariffs on imported PCMDPs would tend to raise the prices of critical minerals, magnets, batteries, chips, motors, and similar inputs used in autos, electronics, clean‑energy gear, and weapons systems.
• Supply security: If higher prices and supporting policies successfully encourage more domestic and “friend‑shored” production, manufacturers could gain more reliable access to key materials, reducing the risk of sudden cut‑offs from adversarial suppliers (notably China) during crises.
• Re‑shoring incentives: Tighter control over imports may push companies to localize more of their supply chains (mining, refining, and downstream manufacturing) in the U.S. or trusted partners.

For consumer prices

• Over time, higher costs for inputs such as batteries, permanent magnets, and advanced electronics would likely be partly passed through to consumers, raising prices for cars (especially EVs), electronics, appliances, and some clean‑energy equipment.
• The administration argues this trade‑off is justified by greater resilience for critical sectors and national security.

Past Section 232 actions on steel and aluminum show a similar pattern: they raised raw‑material costs for downstream users while supporting domestic producers and were justified on national‑security and industrial‑capacity grounds.

The immediate next steps and timeline, based on the proclamation and the earlier Section 232 order, are:

1. Negotiations begin: The Secretary of Commerce and the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) are ordered to jointly negotiate agreements with trading partners to address the national‑security threat from PCMDP imports and to promote adoption of price floors.
2. Up to 180 days for agreements: The fact sheet states that if the directed agreements “are not entered into within 180 days of the proclamation, are not being carried out, or are ineffective,” the President may take further action under Section 232 to adjust PCMDP imports.
3. Ongoing monitoring: The Secretary of Commerce must inform the President of any circumstances that indicate a need for additional Section 232 action on PCMDPs.
4. Potential follow‑on measures: After the 180‑day window, depending on the outcome of negotiations and Commerce’s advice, the President can decide whether to impose tariffs, quotas, or other restrictions, or to adopt complementary measures to support domestic mining and processing.

Thus, the key near‑term milestone is the 180‑day period after January 14, 2026, during which the administration will conduct talks with allies and partners and then decide whether further trade measures are needed.