President orders second Emergency Board to investigate Long Island Rail Road labor disputes

Under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), an “emergency board” (often called a Presidential Emergency Board or PEB) is a temporary panel the President appoints when a rail or airline labor dispute has gone so far that it could seriously disrupt transportation.

Its legal powers are limited but important:

• It investigates the dispute and the facts (wages, work rules, benefits, negotiations to date) and may hold hearings.
• It then issues a written report to the President—either making non‑binding settlement recommendations (for a first board) or, in commuter‑rail cases like this second LIRR board, selecting the “most reasonable” of the parties’ final offers under section 9A(g).
• While the board is operating, the RLA legally freezes the “status quo”: for a set period, neither side may change pay, rules, or working conditions or use “self‑help” (strikes, lockouts, unilateral changes) except by mutual agreement.

The board does not have authority to force a contract on the parties; its influence comes from its public report, the cooling‑off periods, and statutory penalties that can apply after its decision in commuter‑rail cases.

Section 9A of the Railway Labor Act (45 U.S.C. § 159a) creates a special, multi‑step procedure for publicly funded commuter railroads like the Long Island Rail Road. Key requirements and timelines are:

1. First emergency board (already used in 2025 LIRR dispute)

   • After normal bargaining and mediation fail, if the President has not already created a regular §160 board, either party or a governor may request a commuter emergency board (9A(b)).
   • On such a request, the President must create a board to investigate and report (9A(c)(1)).
   • For 120 days from the board’s creation, the parties must not change the conditions that gave rise to the dispute, except by agreement (a long “status‑quo” period) (9A(c)(1)).
   • Within 60 days of that board’s creation, if there is still no settlement, the National Mediation Board must hold a public hearing where each party explains why it did not accept the board’s recommendations (9A(d)).

2. Second emergency board (the January 2026 LIRR order)

   • If there is still no settlement by the end of the 120‑day period after the first board was created, any party or affected governor may request a second emergency board; the President must establish it (9A(e)).
   • Within 30 days after the second board is created, each side must submit its final offer for settlement (9A(f)).
   • Within the next 30 days, the second board must report to the President, choosing the “most reasonable” of those final offers (9A(g)).
   • From the time the second board is requested until 60 days after it issues its report, the parties must maintain the status quo—no unilateral changes to pay, rules, or working conditions (9A(h)).

In practice, for this second LIRR board:

• Day 0: Board becomes effective (Jan. 16, 2026).
• By about Day 30: LIRR and the unions must deliver complete final contract offers.
• By about Day 60: The board must pick the more reasonable offer and report to the President.
• For 60 more days after that report, the parties are still barred from strikes, lockouts, or changing the disputed conditions unless they agree otherwise.

The disputes involve the Long Island Rail Road Company and employees represented by five unions:

• Transportation Communications Union (TCU)
• Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen (BLET)
• Brotherhood of Railroad Signalmen (BRS)
• International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM)
• International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (IBEW)

The executive orders and related notices describe the parties at the level of these unions and “certain of [LIRR’s] employees” they represent; they do not list more detailed job categories, though in general these unions cover clerical and station employees, locomotive engineers, signal employees, mechanical workers, and electrical workers.

Under section 9A(f) of the Railway Labor Act, when a second commuter‑rail emergency board is created, each side must submit its “final offer for settlement of the dispute” within 30 days.

In practical terms:

• Each party (LIRR and the unions collectively or individually) submits a complete, last‑best contract proposal covering the open issues—wages, benefits, work rules, job security, and other disputed terms. The statute does not prescribe a template; the offers just need to be full enough for the board to compare them as competing overall packages.
• The three‑member emergency board (appointed by the President under §9A(e) and this order) reviews the offers, the record of the dispute, and any evidence or arguments the parties provide.
• Within 30 days after those offers are submitted, the board must report to the President selecting the “most reasonable” of the final offers (9A(g)).

So “final offers for settlement” are comprehensive last‑round proposals from each side, evaluated by the presidentially appointed board, which then chooses one and reports that choice to the President.

The Emergency Board’s recommendation or selection is not legally binding; the Railway Labor Act does not force either side to accept it.

If the parties do not accept the second board’s chosen final offer:

• After the 60‑day status‑quo period that follows the board’s report (9A(h)), both sides regain the right to use “self‑help”—for example, unions may strike and the carrier may impose new terms or lock out employees, unless Congress intervenes.
• However, section 9A creates financial penalties depending on whose final offer the board selected:
  • If the carrier’s offer is selected and employees then strike over the dispute after the 60 days, those employees lose eligibility for Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act benefits during the work stoppage (9A(i)).
  • If the employees’ offer is selected, and the carrier still refuses to accept it and a work stoppage occurs, the carrier loses access to any multi‑carrier support agreements designed to provide benefits during a work stoppage (9A(j)).

In short, the parties can reject the recommendation, but after the legally required cooling‑off period they face a return to open conflict, plus targeted loss of benefits depending on who turned down the selected offer.

For this Long Island Rail Road dispute, the President appoints all three members of the Emergency Board (a chair plus two members). The executive order and the Railway Labor Act built‑in rules to reduce conflicts of interest and promote impartiality:

• Presidential appointment: Section 1 of both the 2025 and 2026 executive orders states that the board is “composed of a chair and two other members, all of whom shall be appointed by the President.”
• Disinterest requirement: The same section provides that “No member shall be pecuniarily or otherwise interested in any organization of railroad employees or any carrier”, mirroring the RLA’s general rule for emergency boards (45 U.S.C. § 160). This bars people who work for, have financial stakes in, or otherwise have a direct interest in a rail carrier or rail union from serving.
• Case‑specific boards: Section 160 requires each emergency board to be “created separately in each instance”, reinforcing that members are chosen fresh for the specific dispute rather than being standing representatives of one side.

These statutory and executive‑order requirements are the primary formal safeguards to ensure that board members are independent of both the railroad and the unions involved.

The requirement to “make no change in the conditions out of which the disputes arose” is the RLA’s “status quo” rule. In this context it means:

• No strikes or lockouts: During the status‑quo period defined in section 9A(h)—from the time a request for this second board was made until 60 days after the board submits its report—neither the unions nor the railroad may engage in work stoppages or lockouts over the covered dispute.
• No unilateral changes in pay, rules, or working conditions: The carrier cannot, for example, impose new wage scales, schedules, or work rules that are part of the dispute, and the unions cannot unilaterally change how they perform the disputed work. Any change requires mutual agreement.

This mirrors the general RLA rule in §160 (for non‑commuter boards) and is restated in section 3 of the 2026 order: it is expressly designed to prevent disruptions to commuter rail service while the board conducts its investigation and the parties consider its decision.

The National Mediation Board (NMB) is an independent U.S. federal agency that administers the Railway Labor Act for railroads and airlines, including mediation and certain arbitration and emergency‑board procedures.

In this case, once the second Emergency Board finishes its work:

• The executive order specifies that “[t]he records and files of the Board are records of the Office of the President and upon the Board’s termination shall be maintained in the physical custody of the National Mediation Board.”
• That means NMB will store and maintain the official case file—the parties’ submissions, hearing transcripts (if any), exhibits, and the board’s report—essentially acting as the archival custodian.

Separately, section 9A(d) of the RLA also assigns the NMB an active role after the first commuter emergency board (holding a public hearing if no settlement), and the NMB’s own guidance explains its broader oversight of Presidential Emergency Boards and the RLA dispute‑resolution process.