Public information so far is very limited. DHS’s January 12, 2026 press release describes the new Program Executive Office (PEO) for Unmanned Aircraft Systems and Counter‑Unmanned Aircraft Systems as an office “dedicated to rapidly procuring and deploying drone and counter‑drone technologies” and “oversee[ing] strategic investments” in these capabilities, including managing a new $1.5 billion contract vehicle for components such as CBP and ICE. DHS has not yet released a detailed organizational chart, named a PEO director, or spelled out component reporting lines in public documents; only a generic contact email (drones@dhs.gov) has been published, so the specific leadership structure remains undisclosed.
DHS has said only that the new Program Executive Office will “this week” finalize a $115 million investment in counter‑drone technologies to secure America250 events and 2026 FIFA World Cup venues, but it has not publicly broken down that $115 million by technology type, vendor, location, or specific deployments. Some related funding is flowing through FEMA’s separate $500 million Counter‑Unmanned Aircraft Systems Grant Program, which prioritizes the 11 states hosting 2026 World Cup matches and the National Capital Region, but that program accounts for $250 million in FY 2026 and is distinct from the $115 million DHS PEO package. No finer‑grained allocation for the $115 million has been released.
DHS documents describe the counter‑UAS capabilities it seeks in functional terms rather than naming specific products. The department’s counter‑UAS programs and grants focus on technologies that can detect, identify, monitor, track, and, in some cases, mitigate hostile drones. DHS and FEMA materials refer to purchasing “detection, identifying, monitoring, tracking, and mitigation (DIMT‑M) technologies,” which can include radar, radio‑frequency and optical detection; electronic measures such as jamming or taking control of a drone; and limited kinetic or other means to disable or down a drone, subject to federal law. Specific system models or exact mixes (purely detection vs. jamming, capture, or kinetic systems) for the new DHS PEO procurements have not yet been detailed publicly.
The 2018 law is the Preventing Emerging Threats Act of 2018, enacted as Division H of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018. It granted DHS (and DOJ) statutory authority, within defined “covered facilities or assets,” to: (1) detect, identify, monitor, and track unmanned aircraft without being constrained by certain federal surveillance and computer‑crime statutes; and (2) disrupt, control, seize, or destroy drones that present a credible threat to the safety or security of those covered sites, notwithstanding certain FAA and FCC rules. Use of these powers is limited to specific missions and must comply with statutory reporting, coordination, and privacy requirements.
DHS’s January 12, 2026 release says that in December “DHS authorities were broadened, authorizing all Department Components, state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement partners, and correctional agencies to fully combat drone threats,” but it does not spell out the precise new powers for non‑federal partners. Related federal documents show that recent law and policy are expanding state and local roles mainly through: (1) new counter‑UAS grant funding for state, local, tribal and territorial (SLTT) governments to acquire detection and limited mitigation technologies; and (2) new statutory counter‑UAS authority for SLTT law enforcement in the FY 2026 defense legislation, subject to strict training, certification, and operational standards set by DHS and DOJ. However, the exact December change referenced by DHS—what SLTT agencies can now do operationally that they could not before—has not yet been fully detailed in publicly available DHS rules or guidance, so the scope of those “expanded authorities” remains only partly clear from open sources.
DHS states that its use of counter‑UAS technologies is subject to dedicated privacy and civil liberties safeguards. Department‑wide and program‑specific Privacy Impact Assessments for counter‑UAS activities explain that: (1) systems are intended to focus on drones and their control signals, not on collecting or retaining personally identifiable information (PII) about bystanders; (2) any incidental PII captured (for example, in video feeds) must be minimized, protected, and retained only as long as necessary for an authorized mission; (3) access to data and systems is limited to trained personnel, with auditing and oversight; and (4) operations must comply with the U.S. Constitution, including the First and Fourth Amendments, DHS civil rights and civil liberties policies, and applicable FAA and DOJ guidance. DHS says it uses these PIAs, rules of engagement, and oversight mechanisms to mitigate privacy risks when testing and deploying drone detection and mitigation technology.
The January 12, 2026 DHS announcement names components such as Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) as key users of the new contract vehicle, and notes that “all Department Components” are now authorized to combat drone threats. In practice, DHS counter‑UAS systems are and will be operated day‑to‑day by mission agencies such as CBP (border and port security), ICE, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) at transportation hubs, the U.S. Secret Service and other protective details at high‑risk events, the Coast Guard for maritime security, and state, local, tribal and territorial partners receiving FEMA grants. Their use is constrained by the Preventing Emerging Threats Act and related authorities, which limit active mitigation (e.g., disabling or taking control of a drone) to situations where a drone poses a “credible threat” to the safety or security of a legally defined “covered facility or asset,” and require adherence to DHS rules of engagement, training, and interagency coordination with FAA and DOJ. Detailed, component‑specific trigger criteria are set in internal CONOPS and are not publicly disclosed.
Available documents indicate that DHS evaluates counter‑UAS procurements and deployments using testing, oversight, and performance measures, but do not yet describe a metric set unique to the new PEO. DHS Science & Technology’s counter‑UAS program assesses systems in both laboratory and real‑world environments, including formal test and evaluation under 6 U.S.C. § 124n, to measure detection range and accuracy, false‑positive and false‑negative rates, reliability, and operational suitability. FEMA’s C‑UAS Grant Program NOFO adds program‑level performance measures such as whether funded projects improve jurisdictions’ ability to detect, identify, track, and (where authorized) mitigate unlawful drones at high‑risk events. Standard DHS grant and acquisition oversight—privacy and civil‑rights reviews, financial and programmatic reporting, and potential program evaluation—also applies. However, DHS has not yet published a detailed oversight framework or specific quantitative metrics that the new Program Executive Office itself will use to judge the effectiveness of its $115 million investment or the larger $1.5 billion contract vehicle.