Democrats Once Demanded Maduro’s Ouster. Now They Mourn His Capture — Because Trump Did It.

Yes. Multiple independent outlets report that U.S. forces conducted a large nighttime operation in Caracas on January 3, 2026, that seized Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. They were flown on a U.S. warship (identified in some reports as the USS Iwo Jima) to New York, landing at Stewart Air National Guard Base the same day, and transferred into U.S. federal custody in Manhattan. Maduro has since appeared in federal court in New York and pleaded not guilty, confirming he is in the United States and under U.S. control. The operation was ordered by President Donald Trump and carried out by U.S. military forces in support of the Department of Justice.

There was no specific authorization from Congress or the U.N. for this operation, and most legal experts and many lawmakers argue the president did not have lawful authority to order it in the way he did.

Under U.S. law: Congress did not pass an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) for Venezuela, and the administration did not seek approval beforehand. The White House instead characterizes the raid as a law‑enforcement–style arrest of indicted fugitives and a defensive move against drug cartels, relying on the president’s contested Article II commander‑in‑chief powers. Constitutional and war‑powers scholars, along with many members of Congress, say that sending thousands of troops, conducting airstrikes across Venezuela, and removing its head of state exceeds what the president can do unilaterally and violates both the Constitution’s allocation of war powers and the War Powers Resolution.

Under international law: The operation was widely condemned by U.N. officials and numerous governments as a clear violation of Venezuelan sovereignty and the U.N. Charter’s ban on the use of force except in self‑defense or with Security Council authorization. Legal scholars note there was no U.N. mandate and drug trafficking does not meet the accepted standard of an “armed attack” that would justify self‑defense.

“Indicted narcoterrorist” refers to a series of U.S. federal indictments in the Southern District of New York (SDNY) accusing Nicolás Maduro of leading a long‑running, drug‑fueled criminal conspiracy tied to terrorism.

Key charges include:

• Narco‑terrorism conspiracy (21 U.S.C. § 960a): alleging that from about 1999 onward, Maduro and other officials partnered with Colombia’s FARC and others to ship tons of cocaine to the United States while using drugs as a weapon against the U.S.
• Cocaine‑importation conspiracy and related drug‑trafficking counts (21 U.S.C. §§ 812, 959, 960, 963).
• Later superseding indictments add weapons charges such as conspiracy to possess machine guns and destructive devices in furtherance of drug‑trafficking crimes.

The original narco‑terrorism indictment was unsealed on March 26, 2020, and a superseding SDNY indictment was unsealed in early 2026 ahead of his capture and transfer to New York.

Temporary Protected Status (TPS) is a humanitarian program that lets people from certain countries already in the United States stay and work here legally for a limited period when returning home would be unsafe due to war, natural disaster, or “extraordinary and temporary” conditions. TPS does not by itself give permanent residency or citizenship, but it protects from deportation, allows application for work permits, and can allow travel with prior approval.

For Venezuelans, the U.S. first designated Venezuela for TPS in 2021 and later redesignated/extended it in 2023, allowing several hundred thousand Venezuelans who met presence and background requirements to live and work legally in the U.S. As of late 2025, the Trump administration has moved to terminate the newer (2023) designation and set an end date for the 2021 designation, though court orders and DHS notices allow some current TPS holders to keep work authorization until as late as October 2, 2026. After TPS expires, individuals revert to whatever immigration status they had before TPS unless they qualify for and obtain another status.

Many of the “THEN” quotes in the White House article do reflect real past statements by these Democrats criticizing Maduro and supporting pressure or a democratic transition, but the way they are presented is selective and omits important context.

Examples:

• Chuck Schumer (2019): His “crisis in Venezuela” statement called Maduro an illegitimate leader and backed international efforts for free elections, but it also warned against reckless U.S. military intervention, which the White House article downplays.
• Durbin, Van Hollen, Schumer and others: Letters and bills they backed urged granting TPS to Venezuelans and increasing diplomatic and economic pressure on Maduro’s regime, not endorsing a U.S. invasion or unilateral abduction.
• Darren Soto: His 2019 Venezuela TPS Act press materials describe Maduro’s “oppressive dictatorship” and support protection for Venezuelans in the U.S., not U.S. military action inside Venezuela.

Full, original statements can be found on the lawmakers’ official sites and Senate/House press pages. Comparing those documents shows that while the quotes are generally accurate snippets, the White House piece strips out surrounding language that also emphasized multilateral diplomacy, humanitarian relief, and opposition to unauthorized war.

The operation is expected to have serious and largely negative diplomatic and security consequences in the region, even as some actors welcome Maduro’s removal.

Diplomatic fallout:

• Many governments and international bodies (including the U.N. Secretary‑General, France, Mexico, China, and Russia) have condemned the raid as a violation of international law and Venezuelan sovereignty, straining U.S. relations and fueling accusations of “hegemonic” behavior.
• Regional governments worry the precedent could justify future cross‑border interventions by other powers in their own neighborhoods.

Regional stability and security:

• Venezuela’s power structure is unsettled: the vice president has claimed the interim presidency while remaining loyal to Maduro; exiled opposition figures claim a separate democratic mandate. This raises risks of internal conflict, repression, or fragmentation of security forces.
• Neighboring countries, notably Colombia, are mobilizing forces and preparing for refugee flows, fearing spillover violence and instability.

Risk to Americans and U.S. interests:

• Analysts and some U.S. lawmakers warn that Maduro loyalists, aligned armed groups, or allied states (such as Cuba) could retaliate against U.S. personnel, diplomats, or assets in the region.
• Legal experts also caution that the U.S. occupation‑style role Trump has described—“running” Venezuela and overseeing its oil industry—could draw the U.S. into a prolonged, vulnerable presence on the ground, with attendant risks of insurgent attacks and hostage‑taking.